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Abstract: This paper examines the rationale, nature and financial consequences of two alternative 
approaches to portfolio regulations for the long-term institutional investor sectors life insurance and pension 
funds. These approaches are, respectively, prudent person rules and quantitative portfolio restrictions. The 
argument draws on the financial-economics of investment, the differing characteristics of institutions’ 
liabilities, and the overall case for regulation of financial institutions. Among the conclusions are: 
· regulation of life insurance and pensions need not be identical;  
· prudent person rules are superior to quantitative restrictions for pension funds except in certain 
specific circumstances (which may arise notably in emerging market economies), and;  
· although in general restrictions may be less damaging for life insurance than for pension funds, 
prudent person rules may nevertheless be desirable in certain cases also for this sector, particularly 
in competitive life sectors in advanced countries, and for pension contracts offered by life 
insurance companies. 
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Adopting a financial economics (rather than actuarial) perspective, this paper seeks to assess the 
justification, nature and consequences of regulations on the asset portfolios of life insurance companies2 
and pension funds3. Broadly speaking, there are two main alternative approaches, namely “prudent person 
rules” which enjoin portfolio diversification and broad asset-liability matching, and “quantitative portfolio 
regulations” which limit holdings of certain types of asset within the portfolio. Both seek to ensure 
adequate portfolio diversification and (notably for insurers) liquidity of the asset portfolio, but in radically 
different ways. These are not, however, polar opposites and there are certain gradations between the two, 
as is revealed by the experience of a range of OECD countries which are used as raw material for the 
analysis. 
 
We develop the argument by first showing the particular considerations that apply for asset management of 
life companies and pension funds, respectively, abstracting from regulation. We then consider the overall 
case for regulation of such institutional investors and note the different types of regulation, which apply (in 
particular highlighting that those potentially affecting asset holdings include solvency/minimum funding 
regulations and accounting rules as well as portfolio regulations per se). We go on to consider the overall 
case for and against the different types of portfolio regulations. We show how considerations may differ 
between life insurance companies and pension funds, depending largely on differences in liabilities, and also 
how differing circumstances (such as emerging markets versus advanced industrial countries) may lead to 
varying prescriptions. We then compare and contrast portfolio regulations for life insurance and pension 
funds in nine OECD countries, and thereafter highlight the differences in portfolios between these 
countries, considering the extent to which the restrictions actually bind and noting some of the other factors 
that may affect portfolio composition. We also assess the differences in terms of real returns achieved on 
portfolios as between prudent person and restriction-based regimes. In the conclusion we seek to assess a 
number of key policy issues, in particular whether life companies and pension funds should have identical 
regulations and whether prudent person rules are superior to quantitative asset restrictions for either or 
both of the sectors. 
 
                                                                 
2  We abstract from property and casualty insurance since it is life insurance, which is most closely akin to 
pension funds (as offering a mix of insurance and saving), and hence offers the most fruitful comparison of asset 
regulations. 
3  For an earlier assessment of issues in the regulation of pension fund assets see Davis (1998). Among the key 
findings was a markedly lower return - and generally comparable risk - for sectors with quantitative restrictions as 
opposed to a prudent person rule. 
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1 Investment considerations for institutional investors  
 
In this introductory section we introduce the issues in institutional investment in general terms , 
before going on in the next section to trace the economic influences on portfolio distributions of life insurers 
and pension funds, which would operate freely in the absence of portfolio and funding regulations and if 
there were appropriate accounting methods. This is seen as essential background for a comprehensive 
assessment of portfolio regulations. 
 
1.1 General portfolio considerations  
 
The most basic aim of investment is to achieve an optimal trade-off of risk and return by allocation of 
the portfolio to appropriately diversified combinations of assets (and in some cases liabilities, i.e. leveraging 
the portfolio by borrowing). The precondition for such an optimal trade-off is ability to attain the frontier of 
efficient portfolios, where there is no possibility of increasing return without increasing risk, or of reducing 
risk without reducing return. Any portfolio where it is possible to increase return without raising risk is 
inefficient and is dominated by a portfolio with more return for the same risk.  The exact trade-off chosen 
will depend on objectives, preferences and constraints on investors.  
 
1.2 Steps in institutional investment 
 
There are common features of all types of institutional investment (see Trzcinka (1997), (1998) Bodie et al 
(1996)) which form a further useful introduction to an assessment of portfolios and appropriate restrictions. 
First there is identification of the investors' objectives/preferences and constraints. 
 
In terms of objectives, there is a need to assess where on the above-mentioned optimal risk return trade-
off the investor wishes to be, in other words his risk tolerance in pursuit of return.  These issues are 
discussed for insurance companies and pension funds in the sections below. 
 
As regards constraints, these may include liquidity, investment horizon, inflation sensitivity, regulations, tax 
and accounting considerations and unique needs. All of these may link to the nature of the liabilities, for 
example: 
· liquidity based constraints link to the right for investors to withdraw funds as a lump sum, or the current 
needs for regular disbursement; 
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· the investment horizon relates to the planned liquidation date of the investment (e.g. retirement or 
maturity of a life contract), and is often measured by the concept of effective maturity or duration4; 
· inflation sensitivity relates to the need to hold assets as inflation hedges, such as index linked bonds (or 
in their absence, equities or real estate); 
· tax considerations may change the nature of the trade-off, and 
· accounting rules can generate different 'optimal' portfolios, although market value accounting is needed 
to produce an appropriate portfolio in an economic sense. Finding a market value may itself be problematic 
for illiquid assets such as loans, art works and even real estate. 
· finally there is the influence of regulations per se. Besides those linking to asset allocation, the main 
focus of this paper, there are sometimes liability restrictions, which may thereby affect desired asset 
allocations e.g. by enforcing indexation of repayments or minimum solvency levels. 
 
This discussion emphasises that there are a variety of constraints which apply to life insurers or pension 
funds, all of which may have a marked effect on optimal portfolios, even abstracting from regulation. 
Notably, the nature of the liabilities is the key to understanding how institutional investors differ in their 
operations. A liability is a cash outlay made at a specific time to meet the contractual terms of an obligation 
issued by an institutional investor. Such liabilities differ in certainty and timing, from known outlay and 
timing (bank deposit) through known outlay but uncertain timing (traditional life insurance), uncertain outlay 
and known timing (floating rate debt) and uncertain outlay and uncertain timing (pension funds, 
endowment/unit linked life insurance, property and casualty insurance). It will be seen that certainty needs 
will vary within groups, e.g. a pension fund may require lesser certainty than a life insurer in nominal terms. 
In this context, an institutional investor will seek to earn a satisfactory return on invested funds and to keep 
a reasonable surplus of assets over liabilities. Risk must be sufficient to ensure adequate returns but not so 
great as to threaten solvency. The nature of liabilities also determines the institutions' liquidity needs. 
 
After these considerations are taken into account, investment strategies are developed and 
implemented. A primary decision is to choose the asset categories to be included in the portfolio - usually 
money market instruments, shares, bonds, real estate, loans and foreign assets. Market conditions are 
monitored, using historic data on macroeconomic and financial variables as well as economic forecasts, to 
determine expectations of rates of return over the holding period. The efficient frontier can be derived 
between risk and return, depending on the probability distribution of holding period returns. Below the 
frontier the asset allocation is inefficient in the sense that risk can be reduced or return increased with no 
                                                                 
4  Duration is the average time to an asset's discounted cash flows. 
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change to the other variable. An optimal asset mix may then be derived, selecting the portfolio that is 
efficient, which meets the required trade-off of risk and return and satisfies the constraints. Portfolio 
adjustments are made as appropriate when relevant variables change (such as market conditions, relative 
asset values and forecasts thereof, and the evolving nature of investor circumstances). 
 
The investment process is often divided into several components, with asset allocation (or strategic 5 asset 
allocation) referring to the long term decision on the disposition of the overall portfolio, while tactical asset 
allocation relates to short term adjustments to this basic choice between asset categories in the light of 
short term profit opportunities, so-called “market timing”. Meanwhile security selection relates to the 
choice of individual assets to be held within each asset class, which may be both strategic and tactical. 
Investment restrictions typically apply most strongly to asset allocation between instruments but may also 
affect security selection (e.g. if there is a limit on exposures as a proportion of the institution’s balance 
sheet, or as a proportion of the equity of the firm invested in). 
 
It is evident that the influence of any binding quantitative portfolio regulations may be to constrain this 
process and potentially prevent the institution from achieving via  strategic asset allocation the point on the 
frontier of efficient portfolios that is appropriate for the institution’s liabilities - or it may even force the 
institution to hold an inefficient portfolio which is below the frontier. They may also limit the profit that can 
be made from tactical asset allocation, and even in some cases limit security selection (where for example 
there are limits on credit quality or liquidity of individual assets). 
 
1.3 Alternative approaches to asset allocation 
 
The above considerations are based broadly on the mean-variance model, which assumes that the 
investor chooses an asset allocation based solely on average return and its volatility. Certain considerations 
in respect of liabilities give rise to alternative paradigms of asset allocation, which may imply a very 
different approach to investment (Borio et al 1997): 
 
(1) Immunisation is a special case of the mean-variance approach which implies that the investor tries to 
stabilise the value of the investment at the end of the holding period, i.e. to hold an entirely riskless position; 
this is done typically in respect of interest rate risk by appropriately adjusting the duration of the assets held 
                                                                 
5  Note that strategic choices include not only the disposition of the portfolio but also the choice of active 
versus passive management and domestic versus international. 
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to that of the liabilities. It necessitates a constant rebalancing of the portfolio - as well as the existence of 
assets which have a similar duration to liabilities. 
 
(2) Matching is a particular case of immunisation where the assets precisely replicate the cash flows of 
the liabilities, including any related option characteristics. 
 
(3) Shortfall risk6 and portfolio insurance approaches put a particular stress on avoiding downward 
moves, e.g. in the context of minimum solvency levels for pension funds or insurance companies. Hence, 
unlike mean-variance and immunisation they are not symmetric in respect to the weight put on upward and 
downward asset price moves. Shortfall risk sees the investor as maximising the return on the portfolio 
subject to a ceiling on the probability of incurring a loss (e.g. by shifting from equities to bonds as the 
minimum desired value is approached). In portfolio insurance the investor is considered to want to avoid 
any loss but to retain upside profit potential. This may be achieved by replicating on a continuous basis the 
payoff of a call option on the portfolio by trading between the assets and cash (dynamic hedging), or by use 
of futures and options per se. By these means, the value of a portfolio may be prevented from falling below 
a given value (such as that defined by the value of guaranteed liabilities of an insurance company or the 
minimum funding level of a pension fund). 
 
(4) A further issue is whether the benchmark for investment is seen in nominal terms, as implicitly assumed 
above, or real terms. The benchmark may also be defined relative to the liabilities of the institution such as 
defined benefit pension or insurance claims. Asset management techniques which take into account the 
nature of liabilities are known as asset liability management techniques (ALM) (see also Blake 
(1999)), of which immunisation is a special case. They may be defined as investment technique wherein 
long term balance between assets and liabilities is maintained by choice of a portfolio of assets with similar 
return, risk and duration characteristics to liabilities (although characteristics of individual assets may differ 
from those of liabilities). Equities are a matching asset when liabilities grow at the same pace as real 
wages, as is typical in an ongoing pension fund aiming for a certain replacement ratio at retirement, 
because the labour and capital shares of GDP are roughly constant, and equities constitute capital income. 
Equities may also be appropriate for life insurers having variable policies (see Section 2.1 below). Bonds 
are not a good match for real-wage based liabilities although they do match annuities for pensions and 
nominal life insurance claims. This approach may affect inter alia the appropriate degree of diversification 
of the portfolio. 
                                                                 
6  See Leibowitz and Kogelman (1991). 
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The key point here is that solvency considerations for insurance companies and defined benefit pension 
funds typically require a focus on shortfall risk and asset liability management rather than simple risk-return 
optimisation. As a consequence, for these types of institution, the optimality of portfolio choices cannot 
readily be judged by simple measures such as the mean and standard deviation of the real return. In 
contrast, as discussed in Section 2.2, the mean-variance approach may be appropriate to defined 
contribution funds. 
 
On the other hand, it may be added that quantitative portfolio restrictions may in principle interfere with 
optimal responses to shortfall risk and ALM considerations, for example if they limit use of derivatives or 
restrict necessary shifts in duration, by limiting the degree to which asset composition can be varied. 
 
1.4 Asset return characteristics 
 
As a further preliminary section, it is worthwhile to note the risk and return characteristics of the 
various assets that are held by insurance companies and pension funds, in order to evaluate 
different approaches to investment and investment regulation. The estimated risks and returns based on 
annual data for 1967-95 are illustrated in Table 1. Note that these are real returns and their corresponding 
risks. Nominal returns will be boosted by the corresponding rate of inflation in the country concerned 
(which for example was relatively high in Italy and the UK among this group, see Table 2). It is shown that 
the highest real returns are typically from (domestic) equities, which also have the greatest volatility. Other 
high-return assets are property and foreign assets, followed by bonds and loans, and finally short term 
assets. The “equity premium” return differential between equities and bonds is shown to be 6.3% for these 
countries on average. 
 
Note that contrary to the expectations of finance theory, the volatility pattern based on annual holding 
period returns is not entirely congruent with the pattern of real yields, with total returns on bonds showing a 
relatively high volatility despite rather low real returns. This is partly linked to the fact that in the 1970s, 
bond yields rose sharply, while prices of bonds fell, with high and volatile inflation. This pattern was unique 
in history and has been much less characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Table 2 shows inflation and real average earnings. The latter has been an average of 2% for the countries 
shown. This, as seen below, is a key target of pension fund investment, but generally less relevant for life 
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insurance companies, which may nevertheless seek a return well above the rate of inflation in order to 
maintain competitiveness. 
 
Since portfolio restrictions often limit equity investment and international investment, it is worth adding a 
few further considerations. For equity, there is considerable debate as to whether besides offering a 
sizeable real return it is a hedge against inflation (see Ely and Robinson 1997). Or does it merely raise 
expected returns, and offering benefits of diversification (Bodie 1990a)? Is there a premium in returns of 
equities over bonds that has historically been more than can be explained by relative risk (Mehra and 
Prescott 1985), and is it disappearing (Blanchard 1993) or do we currently have a “bubble” (Bank of 
England 1999)? 
 
Most of the work of equity returns has been undertaken in the United States. Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) 
strike a cautionary note regarding the resultant assumptions commonly made about the long-term returns to 
equity. They show (Table 3) that the historical average results for the US are atypically high, with a 
geometric real return of 4.3% (excluding dividends) since 1921 compared with a 3.4% mean return in other 
world markets (weighted by GDP) – and a median of only 0.8%. Comparative arithmetic mean real 
returns are 5.5% and 3.8%. This takes into account, for example, that in Germany stocks fell by 72% and 
Japanese stocks by 95% in 1944-49. With dividends, real returns were 8.22%, 8.16% in the UK, 7.13% in 
Sweden, 5.57% in Switzerland, 4.88% in Denmark and 4.83% in Germany. Technically, the results for the 
US are subject to “survival bias”. There are two further points to be raised. First, recent returns in all 
markets have far exceeded rates even in the US and hence may not be sustainable, and second, that 
concentration of risk in one market puts investors at risk of total loss of wealth. 
 
The risks on foreign assets  are often lower than for domestic assets of the same type because of the 
diversification benefits of foreign assets, which more than offset exchange rate risk. Crucially, to the extent 
national trade cycles are not correlated, and shocks to equity markets tend to be country-specific, the 
investment of part of the portfolio in other markets can reduce systematic risk for the same return7. In the 
medium term, the profit share in national economies may move differentially, which implies that 
international investment hedges the risk of a decline in domestic profit share and hence in equity values. 
And in the very long term, imperfect correlation of demographic shifts should offer protection against the 
                                                                 
7  Consistent with this, Harvey (1991), shows that markets tend to have correlations of 0.16 to 0.86, with a 
majority in the range 0.4 to 0.7. 
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effects on the domestic economy of ageing of the population8. In effect, international investment in 
countries with a relatively young population may be essential to prevent battles over resources between 
workers and pensioners in countries with an ageing population (Blake 1997). 
 
Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) provide evidence for the returns and risks to international equity investment 
over the period 1921-1996, using GDP to weight portfolio holdings. The results, shown in Table 3, show 
that there is a major reduction in risk, with even inclusion of markets which failed (i.e. ceased to function 
entirely) not greatly reducing the global total return. 
 
We turn now to assess the specific portfolio considerations that arise for insurance companies and pension 
funds. 
 
2 Life insurance and pension fund assets and liabilities 
 
In this section we seek to defined the business of life insurance and pension funds in a manner which is 
relevant for the evaluation of portfolio regulations. We note at the outset that the sharp distinctions made in 
this section are not always appropriate, given the blurring of differences between financial institutions. In 
particular, both life and pension business is often conducted via products employing mutual funds as an 
investment vehicle – themselves a separately regulated financial institution. Examples of products 
concerned are “unit linked” life policies and many types of personal pension product such as the US 401(k) 
plans. 
 
2.1 Life insurance 
 
One may distinguish several parts of an insurance company’s asset portfolio (Dickinson 1998a). First 
there are assets which are held to cover obligations to policyholders. These are generally purchased with 
inflows of premium income and are expected to be repaid in the future. Second, there are assets which 
correspond to the capital funds9 of the company, in other words the surplus over policyholder liabilities (so 
called technical provisions10). There are also fixed assets and current assets (forms of trade credit or other 
                                                                 
8  Erb et al (1997) show how asset returns vary systematically with a country’s demographic characteristics, 
with an older population being more risk averse and demanding a higher premium on equity investment. 
9  Capital funds may be divided into those which fulfil regulatory minima and so-called free capital in excess of 
this amount. Note that ownership of capital varies between state, mutual and publicly-quoted companies, and that the 
incentives of the equity holders may differ considerably between these different forms of ownership structure. 
10  Technical provisions and the corresponding assets can be defined either gross or netting off recoverables 
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receivables). Our main focus is on investments held against technical provisions and investments held 
against the capital base. The investment of the former is constrained by the risk characteristics of the 
liabilities. These derive in turn from the explic it or implicit guarantees related to the contracts that have 
been sold. As will be discussed later, investments against technical provisions are also the part of the 
portfolio which is most commonly subject to investment regulation. 
 
As mentioned, in assessing asset management of insurance companies, we focus throughout this article on 
life business, and largely abstract from property and casualty insurance. The latter, while having 
significant financial assets to back potential claims, does not constitute a mix of long term saving and 
insurance in the manner of life insurance and pension funds. The risks of the property and casualty sector 
are “insurance risks” which arise from highly uncertain flows of claims depending on major disasters and 
court cases offsetting the benefits of the “law of large numbers”. Because of risk and duration 
considerations, their portfolios tend to include a high proportion of short-term assets with rather low price 
volatility, often combined with a significant share of equities. 
 
We now consider the liabilities of life insurance companies, risks and appropriate investment 
strategies, abstracting from regulation. A general point for liabilities of life insurance is that it is 
fundamentally a matter of actuarial calculation (notably using mortality tables as well as assumptions on 
asset returns) to assess and project how much a policyholder may be paid in the case of a claim.  Errors in 
mortality estimates as well as in asset return expectations are hence key sources of risk. Note too, 
however, that besides their actuarial liabilities, life insurers are often allowed to borrow in order to fund 
themselves. 
 
Life insurance company liabilities tended historically to be defined in nominal terms . These nominal 
liabilities would include those arising from term policies (purchased to provide a certain sum in the event of 
death), whole-life policies (term policies with a saving element) and annuities (to give a fixed income for 
the remainder of the insured's life). Guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) - a form of zero coupon bond 
typically sold to pension funds - are a modern variant. Insurers may also offer nominal, insured defined 
benefit pension plans. 
 
However, life companies are increasingly also offering variable policies such as variable life policies, 
variable annuities, with-profits endowment and unit (mutual fund) linked policies. These typically combine a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
from reinsurers. 
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term policy with a saving element aimed at capital appreciation, where for the latter there is no explicit 
guarantee regarding the size of the bonus to be disbursed. Or policies may have option features, with, for 
example, variable returns but a guaranteed floor. Such policies may offer higher returns - and also risks - to 
policyholders while posing less shortfall risk to the surplus of the life insurer. In many countries, including 
the US, there is a deferred-taxation benefit to such investment. Targets for the size of bonuses are 
typically determined by the need to attract new business in the light of competition in the market. Unlike for 
pension funds, discussed in the section below, there is no specific objective for capital appreciation defined 
in terms of average earnings, although this may enter implicitly via “policyholders’ reasonable 
expectations”, to use a current UK expression. As noted, a positive real return (i.e. exceeding consumer 
price inflation) would certainly be a minimum objective of life insurance investment generally. 
 
Besides the popularity of variable policies, insurance companies are heavily involved in investing pension 
monies. This may occur directly on the balance sheet, generally on a defined contribution basis, or 
externally as asset managers in segregated accounts on behalf of defined contribution or defined benefit 
funds.  
 
A life insurer’s liabilities will reflect the chosen balance of these different types of policy, which can 
change over time as insurers choose which markets to serve. What are the risks arising from these 
different types of liability?  
· errors in mortality projections  may affect all life contracts, but especially term policies with a high 
sum insured relative to reserves 
· there is discontinuance risk, when policies are surrendered before the expenses have been 
recovered 
· where there is mandatory or customary early surrender guarantees or rights to take policy loans, there 
will be liquidity risks from this source. 
· interest rate risks  which arise in the context of guaranteed rates of return, notably for policies with 
high reserves relative to the sum insured and for new business (where duration of liabilities may be so long 
that there are no assets to match).  
· there are links between liquidity and interest rate risks, since the demand for policy loans is likely 
to increase when interest rates rise, as policy holders buy high yield, low price bonds. When interest rates 
fall again, the value of bonds rises and the policy holder sells the bonds and repays the loan. The exercise 
of the surrender option will also take place when rates of return on financial assets exceed those expected 
on the policy. 
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· for variable contracts, the risk is also one of inflation affecting real returns that investors anticipate, and 
broader asset-liability matching risk (of which interest rate risk is a special case). 
 
As regards investment strategies, nominal liabilities could be matched or immunised in the sense 
described above, usually using long term bonds. Life companies’ portfolios also need some short term 
liquidity to cover liabilities arising from early surrender of policies and policy loans. On the other hand, the 
introduction of financial derivatives should provide a cheaper way of covering these risks (Blake 1996). For 
example, in order to hedge against the risk of a policy loan option being exercised, the life insurer can sell 
bond futures if it expects interest rates to rise and the policy loan option to be exercised. It may have to sell 
low valued bonds to finance the loan, but is compensated by the profits made on the future hedge. The 
company may later buy bond futures if it expects interest rates to decline. 
 
Unlike traditional policies, variable policies imply active investment in equities, real estate and international 
investments which may be expected to keep pace with inflation, offering a positive real return. The related 
assets may often be held in the form of mutual funds. Pension liabilities, as discussed below, are another 
factor increasing equity and foreign investment. 
 
It will be recalled that an insurance company’s surplus  measures the extent to which assets exceeds the 
value of liabilities which are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed. The surplus is intended to protect the firm 
against insolvency over time, and to finance future growth. Not held explicitly to back liabilities, it is likely 
to be aggressively invested for return to shareholders and development of reserves. The size of the surplus 
has an independent effect on investment from the nature of liabilities. This is because its size will affect the 
prudent degree of investment risk, i.e. the appropriate degree of mismatching of the embedded risks of 
liabilities and the assets held to cover them (Dickinson 1998b). 
 
2.2 Pension funds  
 
Pension funds  collect, pool and invest funds contributed by sponsors and beneficiaries to provide for the 
future pension entitlements of beneficiaries (Davis (1995), Bodie and Davis (2000)). They thus provide 
means for individuals to accumulate saving over their working life so as to finance their consumption needs 
in retirement. Returns to members of pension plans backed by such funds may be purely dependent on the 
market (defined contribution funds) or may be overlaid by a guarantee of the rate of return by the sponsor 
(defined benefit funds). The latter have insurance features which are absent in the former (Bodie 1990b). 
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These include guarantees in respect of replacement ratios (pensions as a proportion of income at 
retirement) subject to the risk of bankruptcy of the sponsor, as well as potential for risk sharing between 
older and younger beneficiaries. Defined contribution plans have tended to grow in recent years, as 
employers have sought to minimise the risk of their obligations, while employees desired funds that are 
readily transferable between employers.  
 
For both defined benefit and defined contribution funds, the portfolio distribution and the corresponding 
return and risk on the assets seek to match or preferably exceed the growth of average labour earnings. 
This will maximise the replacement ratio (pension as a proportion of final earnings) obtainable by purchase 
of an annuity at retirement financed via an occupational or personal defined contribution fund11 and reduce 
the cost to a company of providing a given pension in a defined benefit plan12. This link of liabilities to 
labour earnings points to a crucial difference with insurance companies, in that pension funds face the 
risk of increasing nominal liabilities (for example, due to wage increases), as well as the risk of holding 
assets, and hence need to trade volatility with return. In effect, their liabilities are typically denominated 
in real terms  and are not fixed in nominal terms. Hence, they must also focus on real assets which offer 
some form of inflation protection. This implies a particular focus on equities and property. 
 
An additional factor which will influence the portfolio distributions of an individual pension fund is maturity 
- the ratio of active to retired members. The duration of liabilities (that is, the average time to discounted 
pension payment requirements) is much longer for an immature fund having few pensions in payment than 
for a mature fund where sizeable repayments are required. A fund which is closing down (or “winding 
up”) will have even shorter duration liabilities. Blake (1994) suggests that given the varying duration of 
liabilities it is rational for immature funds having "real" liabilities as defined above to invest mainly in equities 
(whose cash flows have a long duration), for mature funds to invest in a mix of equities and bonds, and 
funds which are winding-up mainly in bonds (whose cash flows have a short duration). Flexibility in the 
duration of assets, which may require major shifts in portfolios, is hence essential over time; in 
contrast, while life insurers liabilities also have variable duration, the declining duration of a nominal life 
policy can be matched more readily by conventional bonds as they themselves approach maturity. 
 
                                                                 
11 The growth of receipts under funding with "defined contributions" depends on the rate of return on the 
assets accumulated during the working life. The actual pension received per annum varies with the number of years of 
retirement relative to working age (the "passivity ratio"). 
12  Under full funding, the contribution rate to obtain a given "defined benefit" replacement rate depends on 
the difference between the growth rate of wages (which determines the pension needed for a given replacement rate) 
and the return on assets, as well as the passivity ratio (the proportion of life spent after retirement). 
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Pension funds are often subject to pressures to invest according to non-financial objectives. Notably 
there is often pressure to invest in “socially responsible” ways13 (although there is also a growing mutual 
fund sector specialising in socially responsible investment or SRI). Funds may also be directed to invest in 
local infrastructure projects (see Clark 1999). The reasons for such pressures may include their tax 
privileged non-profit status and a (mis)perceived link of pension financing to security of employment. There 
is a potential conflict between such restricted or directed investment and risk and return optimisation from 
the beneficiary or sponsors’ point of view. For example, Mitchell and Hsin (1994) noted that public pension 
plans at a state and local level in the US were often obliged to devote a proportion of assets to state 
specific projects to "build a stronger job and tax base". These funds in turn tended to earn lower overall 
returns than others, suggesting inefficient investment. 
 
Further key distinctions arise in the liabilities and investment approach of defined contribution and defined 
benefit funds: 
 
2.2.1  Defined contribution pension funds  
 
In a defined contribution pension fund the sponsors are only responsible for making contributions to the 
plan. There is no guarantee regarding assets at retirement, which depend on growth in the assets of the 
plan. Accordingly the financial risks to which the provider of a defined contribution plan (as opposed to 
beneficiaries) is exposed are minimal. In some cases, solely the sponsor and the investment managers it 
employs choose the portfolio distribution, and hence there is a risk of legal action by beneficiaries against 
poor investment. But increasingly, employees are left also to decide the asset allocation via choice of 
mutual funds (e.g. in the US 401(k) plans). The remaining obligation on the sponsor is to maintain 
contributions. 
 
As regards portfolio objectives, a defined contribution pension plan should in principle seek to maximise 
return for a given risk, so as to attain as high as possible a replacement ratio at retirement. This implies 
following closely the standard mean-variance portfolio optimisation schema outlined in Section 1.1 above. 
As noted by Blake (1997), in order to choose the appropriate point on the frontier of efficient portfolios, it is 
necessary to determine the degree of risk tolerance of the scheme member; the higher the acceptable risk, 
                                                                 
13  In the UK in 1999 19% of private sector funds and 31% of public sector funds said they took ethical 
considerations into account in investing (Targett 2000). 
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the higher the expected value at retirement14. The fund will also need to shift to lower risk assets for 
older workers  as they approach retirement15, thus reducing duration as outlined above and reducing 
exposure to market volatility shortly before retirement which might otherwise risk to sharply reduce 
pensions. They will imply marked portfolio shifts over time. 
 
Until the approach of retirement necessitates a shift to bonds, the superior returns on equity are likely to 
ensure a significant share of the portfolio is accounted for by equities, depending on the degree of risk 
aversion. Where employers choose the asset mix, the degree of risk aversion is likely to be related to the 
fear of litigation when the market value of a more aggressive asset mix declines16, where employees 
choose the asset allocation it is more direct risk aversion. 
 
2.2.2 Defined benefit pension funds  
 
Unlike defined contribution funds, defined benefit funds are subject to a wide range of risks: 
· Real labour earnings will affect the replacement ratio which can be financed by the pension 
fund, and given there is usually a guarantee of a certain replacement rate, the fund is subject to 
risk from this source.  
· Liabilities will also be influenced by interest rates at which future payments are discounted, and 
hence there are important interest rate risks.  
· Mortality risks affect the cost of the annuities provided by the fund. 
· Falling asset returns  will affect asset/liability balance.  
· There are also risks of changes in government regulation (such as those of indexation, 
portability, vesting and preservation) that can vastly and unexpectedly change liabilities. The 
example of the UK, where such changes have been marked, is discussed in Davis (2000). 
 
Defined benefit fund liabilities are, owing to the sponsor's guarantee, basically a form of corporate debt 
(Bodie 1991). Appropriate investment strategies will depend on the nature of the obligation incurred, 
whether pensions in payment are indexed and the demographic structure of the workforce. Investment 
strategies will also be influenced by the minimum-funding rules imposed by the authorities which determine 
                                                                 
14 Blake (1997) conceptualizes this as maximizing risk adjusted expected value; the expected value of pension 
assets less a risk penalty, defined as the ratio of the variance of the funds assets to the degree of risk tolerance. 
15  Booth and Yakoubov (2000) cast doubt on the need for such “lifestyle investment”. 
16  Meanwhile, the constraint for defined benefit funds in the US is the fear of litigation under the prudent 
person rule if bond shares fall below a "market norm" such as 40%. 
 16
the size of surplus assets. These, as for life insurers, imply a focus on shortfall risk as defined in Section 
1.3. 
 
To further elucidate the appropriate strategies in the context of the nature of the defined benefit pension 
obligation, a number of definitions are needed. The wind-up definition of liabilities, the level at which the 
fund could meet all its current obligations if it were to be closed down completely, is known as the 
accumulated benefit obligation (ABO). The projected benefit obligation (PBO) implies that the 
obligations to be funded include a forward-looking element. It is assumed that rights will continue to accrue, 
and will be labour earnings-indexed up to retirement, as is normal in a final salary plan. The indexed 
benefit obligation (IBO) also assumes price-indexation of pensions in payment after retirement.  
 
If the sponsor seeks to fund the accumulated benefit obligation, and the obligation is purely nominal, 
with a minimum-funding requirement in place, it will be appropriate, as for life insurers, to immunise the 
liabilities with bonds of the same duration to hedge the interest rate risk of these liabilities. Unhedged 
equities will merely imply that such funds incur unnecessary risk (Bodie (1995)), although as for insurance 
companies they may be useful to provide extra return on the surplus over and above the minimum funding 
level.  
 
With a projected benefit obligation target, an investment policy based on diversification may be 
most appropriate, in the belief that risk reduction depends on a maximum diversification of the pension fund 
relative to the firm's operating investments (Ambachtsheer 1988). Moreover, it is normal for defined 
benefit schemes which offer a certain link to salary at retirement for the liability to include an element of 
indexation. Then fund managers and actuaries typically assume that it may be appropriate to include a 
significant proportion of real assets such as equities and property in the portfolio as well as bonds17. By 
doing this, they implicitly diversify between investment risk and liability risk (which are largely risks of 
inflation), see also Daykin (1995). 
 
There are also tax considerations . As shown by Black (1980), for both defined benefit and defined 
contribution funds, there is a fiscal incentive to maximise the tax advantage of pension funds by investing in 
assets with the highest possible spread between pre-tax and post-tax returns. In many countries this tax 
effect gives an incentive to hold bonds. There is also an incentive to overfund with defined benefit to 
                                                                 
17 See the discussion of equities and inflation below. 
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maximise the tax benefits, as well as to provide a larger contingency fund, which is usually counteracted by 
government-imposed limits on funding. 
 
As noted by Blake (1997), minimum funding levels and limits on overfunding provide tolerance limits to the 
variation of assets around the value of liabilities. If the assets are selected in such a way that their risk, 
return and duration characteristics match those of liabilities, there is a "liability immunising portfolio". 
This protects the portfolio against risks of variation in interest rates, real earnings growth and inflation in 
the pension liabilities18. Such a strategy, which determines the overall asset allocation between broad 
classes of instrument, may be assisted by an asset-liability modelling exercise (ALM) as discussed 
above (see Peskin (1997), Blake (2000a))19.  
 
The importance of pension liabilities as a cost to firms , and hence the benefit from higher asset returns, 
is underlined by estimates by the European Federation for Retirement Provision that a 1% improvement in 
asset returns may reduce companies' labour costs by 2-3%, where there is a fully funded, mature, defined 
benefit pension plan. 
 
2.3 Key differences between life insurance companies and pension funds  
 
Drawing on the discussion above, we can note a number of key differences which exist between life 
insurers and pension funds , which one would expect to be reflected in investment strategies and 
correspondingly could be affected by any regulations affecting portfolios: 
 
· the key is that pension fund liabilities are linked explicitly or implicitly to average earnings, 
which grow in real terms. In contrast, life insurance liabilities are either nominal, or have an objective of 
matching or beating price inflation, for competitive reasons. Of course, life insurance companies also run 
pension plans themselves with average earnings objectives, but these are often defined contribution, 
generating no guaranteed liabilities; 
· as a corollary, falling inflation and hence bond yields may affect life insurance business (where they 
are guaranteeing nominal returns) but would not affect pension funds (which seek real returns); 
                                                                 
18 Note that this is distinct from classic immunization, which relates to interest rate risk only. 
19  Note that as described the ALM does not integrate the pension fund with the company balance sheet as 
may be warranted by its status as a collateral for the firm’s guarantee, but treats it as an entirely separate financing 
vehicle. 
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· defined benefit pension liabilities most closely resemble those of life insurers in the sense that they 
have guaranteed obligations which are subject to shortfall risk. Defined contribution liabilities 
resemble more closely those of a mutual fund, having no guarantee element; 
· even for defined benefit funds there is no explicit capital base of a pension fund unlike an insurer. 
There may be surplus assets, but these are typically limited by tax regulations, and may be run down by the 
sponsor (via “contribution holidays”) in order to boost its profitability. In contrast, life companies have their 
capital as a cushion against errors, and also non-guaranteed bonuses on variable policies; 
· a corollary is that any excess returns  on defined benefit pension funds only accrue to the sponsor 
gradually over time (via “contribution holidays”), while excess returns on investments against technical 
provisions profit the insurance company directly. This could affect risk-taking incentives in the absence of 
investment regulations, which might thus be higher for life insurers. Hence regulations might themselves 
need to be tighter; 
· on the other hand, unlike insurance companies, occupational pension funds have a link to a non 
financial firm, whose own capital is effectively the backup for a defined benefit fund. This link is 
formalised in the accounting practice which puts uncovered pension liabilities on the sponsoring firm’s 
balance sheet. Where the firm is solvent, this is often a more extensive source of capital than a life 
insurer’s capital base, as well as being subject to shocks which are relatively independent of those 
affecting pension assets. Arguably this more extensive backup could justify riskier strategies in pension 
funds than for life insurers; 
· life insurance companies are subject to risks not present for pension funds to the same 
degree, such as liquidity risk (for policy loans and guaranteed early surrender values) and expense risk 
(that policies will be surrendered before selling costs have been recouped). As noted, these have 
traditionally been seen as requiring heavy investment in low yielding, capital certain assets - but they could 
also be hedged by derivatives if regulations permit; 
· given the expectedly strong upward trend in longevity, pensions and annuities business is more at risk 
of errors to mortality (since they profit from shorter longevity) than term life business (which profit from 
higher longevity); 
· life companies offer a diverse range of products allowing a degree of diversification (for example 
selling annuities and term policies to protect against longevity risk) while pension funds offer only one form 
of liability; 
· correspondingly, life insurers are better able to control the duration of their liabilities (by 
varying the mix of products sold) than pension funds (where duration is not only difficult to control but may 
also change abruptly due to government policies). Matching of duration is more straightforward for life 
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insurance companies. More generally, liabilities of pension funds are regulated more closely than those of 
life insurers (apart from personal pensions offered by the latter), in terms of aspects such as indexation and 
transferability (see Section 3.1); 
· insurance companies are selling their products in a competitive market and competing both 
with each other and with competing savings products, while (occupational) pension funds are typically 
monopoly providers20 of pensions to workers in a given firm, suggesting a greater need for consumer 
protection. Life insurers are arguably more likely to make errors in premia due to competitive pressures 
than are pension funds in their contributions. As a result of competition, life companies may also have a 
greater incentive for risk taking on the asset side than do pension funds; 
· as noted, pension funds as non-profit making institutions profiting from tax privileges are more subject 
to social pressure on their investments  than are insurance companies. 
 
These contrasts are in our view sufficiently marked to mean that there is not a strong case for identical 
regulations as between life insurers and pension funds. Broadly speaking, defined benefit pension funds 
appear to need more flexibility on the asset side, in order to cater for more dynamic liabilities over which 
they have much less control than is the case for life insurers; while defined contribution funds have no 
guaranteed liabilities at all, hence implying a strong case for freedom to optimise risk and return. In the light 
of the above discussion of investment by life companies and pension funds, we now turn to regulatory 
issues. 
 
3 Regulation of life insurers and pension funds  
 
3.1 Reasons for regulating institutional investors  
 
Given that life insurers and sponsors of pension funds are companies subject to normal legal provisions in 
respect of contracts, bankruptcy fraud and corporate governance, why does a free market solution not 
suffice to optimise conditions for consumers of the corresponding financial products? The expectation that 
the market will provide appropriate contracts is strengthened by the fact that both life insurers (given their 
need to attract new business) and pension funds (given employers’ need to attract good employees) face 
significant reputational costs from any malpractice. 
 
                                                                 
20  Here particularly for defined benefit funds, the competition aspect arises in the market for asset management 
skills, where the sponsor has an incentive to minimise the costs of funding the obligation. 
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Abstracting from issues of redistribution, a case for public intervention in the operation of markets arises 
when there is a market failure, i.e. when a set of market prices fails to reach a Pareto optimal outcome. 
When competitive markets achieve efficient outcomes, there is no case for regulation. There are three key 
types of market failure in finance, namely those relating to information asymmetry, externality and 
monopoly. Moral hazard and adverse selection may also play a role, generally as a corollary of asymmetric 
information. 
 
As regards information asymmetry, if it is difficult or costly for the purchaser of a financial service to 
obtain sufficient information on the quality of the service in question, they may be vulnerable to exploitation. 
This may entail fraudulent, negligent, incompetent or unfair treatment as well as failure of the relevant 
institution per se. Such phenomena are of particular importance for retail users of financial services such 
as those provided by life insurance and personal pensions, because clients are seeking investment of a 
sizeable proportion of their wealth, contracts are one-off and involve a commitment over as much as 40 
years. Such consumers are unlikely to find it economic to make a full assessment of the risks to which life 
insurance companies or pension plans are exposed - including the solvency of the life company and the 
solvency of the sponsor in the case of occupational pension funds. The argument justifies regulations of 
solvency in terms of asset-liability balance or minimum funding levels per se, and also “fit and proper 
controls” on entry in insurance. It could also justify portfolio regulations to avoid a lack of diversification 
and ensure liquidity of the underlying assets, that may otherwise contribute to insolvency of the insurer or 
inability of a pension fund to pay claims if the employer defaults. 
 
Note, however, that many asymmetric information problems are not appropriately addressed by asset or 
capital regulations but rather by regulations for consumer protection, such as best advice, information 
provisions and cooling off periods. This is particularly the case when the institution faces no insolvency risk, 
as in the case of defined contribution pension funds (for a discussion of this issue in the context of 
investment management see Franks and Mayer (1989)). 
 
Externalities arise when the actions of certain firms or individuals have beneficial or adverse 
consequences for others which are not reflected in the market price mechanism. The most obvious type of 
potential externality in financial markets relates to the risk of contagious bank runs, when failure of one 
bank leads to a heightened risk of failure by others, whether due to direct financial linkages (e.g. interbank 
claims) or shifts in perceptions on the part of depositors as to the creditworthiness of certain banks in the 
light of failure of others. Again, solvency regulations may be justified. But given the matching of long run 
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liabilities and long run assets, such externalities are less likely for life insurers and even less so for pension 
funds. There remain some possible externalities from failure of life insurance companies and pension funds, 
notably to the state, whether as direct guarantor or as provider of retirement incomes to those lacking 
them. A failing life insurance company could lead to bank runs indirectly via contagion to the bank within a 
bancassurance group; or a failing bank in a conglomerate could transfer bad assets to the group insurance 
company (Financial Stability Forum 2000). Equally, positive externalities may give reasons for governments 
to encourage life insurance companies and pension funds (e.g. via tax benefits), such as desire to 
economise on the costs of social security or foster the development of capital markets. 
 
A third form of market failure may arise when there is a degree of market power. This may be of 
particular relevance for occupational pension funds, notably when membership is compulsory; hence 
regulatory attention to the interests of members (i.e. liabilities of the fund) is of particular importance in 
such cases, whether or not there is also asymmetric information. As argued by Altman (1992), employers 
in an unregulated environment offering a pension fund effectively on a monopoly basis will structure plans 
to take care of their own interests and concerns, for example will institute onerous vesting rules21 and 
better terms for management than workers. They will also want freedom to fund or not as they wish and to 
maintain pension assets regardless of risk for their own use, regardless of the risk of bankruptcy. Arguably 
a form of market power also applies in the case of life insurers if consumers are “locked in” to policies 
where the early surrender penalties are severe - desire to maintain reputation of the firm is the other 
bulwark for the consumer in this case, but it may not be sufficient if the life market is itself an oligopoly, 
with all firms offering similar policies and conditions. 
 
Justifications for regulation may also include attempts to overcome problems of adverse selection - a 
situation common in insurance markets such as for annuities in which a pricing policy induces a low 
average quality of sellers in a market, while asymmetric information prevents the buyer from distinguishing 
quality.  When it is sufficiently severe, the market may cease to exist. (For example, making annuities 
compulsory reduces adverse selection in that market.) Also there can be moral hazard - where there is an 
incentive to a beneficiary of a fixed-value contract such as pension benefit insurance, in the presence of 
asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, to change her behaviour after the contract has been 
agreed, in order to maximise her wealth, to the detriment of the provider of the contract. 
 
                                                                 
21 It is of interest that unregulated funds in developing countries do indeed institute such rules. 
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Some would argue that life insurance companies and pension funds should be regulated independently 
of these standard market failure justifications , for example to ensure tax benefits are not misused, and 
that the goals of equity, adequacy and security of retirement income are achieved - correcting the market 
failures in annuities markets that necessitate pension funds and social security. Consumer protection may 
go further than is strictly required by the various market failures pointed out above if, for example, it is 
thought that individuals may take excessive risks with their defined contribution pension monies if allowed 
to invest freely. Regulation may also be based on the desire for economic efficiency, for example removing 
barriers to labour mobility. Furthermore, governments may seek to employ regulations for directing the flow 
of investable funds to their desired ends (such as purchase of government bonds, and investment in the 
domestic economy) and to prevent institutional investors from exercising undue corporate governance 
influence on the non financial sector. 
 
Regulations are of course not costless, and excessive regulatory burdens may increase the cost of life 
insurance, discourage provision of private pensions when it is voluntary, and reduce competitiveness of 
companies when occupational pensions are compulsory. Regulations may be divided into those of 
assets/inflows, liabilities/outflows and broader structural regulations. For pension funds, there is a sharp 
division between regulations for defined benefit and defined contribution plans. The reason is that the 
former have guarantee features akin to life insurance companies, whereas the latter have no such features 
and resemble mutual funds. For example, funding and surplus regulations apply only to defined benefit, 
while indexation and portability regulations are more complex for defined benefit. Contributions and 
commissions regulations apply only to defined contribution, while information issues are more important for 
them.  
 
The broad issues which life insurance and pension regulation seeks to address are shown in Table 
4, together with the types of regulation. The main focus of regulation of life insurance contracts is that 
there should be sufficient and appropriate assets to meet obligations to consumers, and that consumers 
should be sold appropriate financial products for their needs, while pension regulation has the broader core 
objective of aiming to ensure that retirement income security for individuals is ensured. As is evident from 
the table, asset regulations are only a subset of the total range of regulations which apply. In our view, 
pension regulation is typically much more wide ranging than that of life insurance notably on the liabilities 
side, where regulations include those of transferability, indexation and annuitisation, none of which are 
typically regulated for life insurers. This in turn reflects the broader objective of pension regulation. The 
general issue arises of whether the wider range of pension regulations (notably on the liabilities side) make 
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portfolio controls more or less necessary. In our judgement they imply a premium on flexibility on the asset 
side. A further issue also shown in Table 4 arises from the fact that life insurance companies often offer 
personal or group pensions as well as life insurance contracts. This means their overall regulation has to 
cover two different kinds of financial contract. 
 
3.2 Prudent person and portfolio restrictions - general considerations  
 
We now go on to assess the different types of investment regulation in more detail. To begin with 
definitions: 
 
A quantitative portfolio regulation is simply a quantitative limit on holdings of a given asset class. 
Typically, those instruments whose holding is limited are those with high price volatility and/or low liquidity. 
For pension funds, there are also often limits on self investment22 of the fund in the assets of the sponsoring 
firm, to protect more directly against the risk of insolvency of the sponsor, and appearance of conflicts of 
interest23. Meanwhile, self investment by life insurance companies is generally forbidden. Furthermore, 
there are commonly restrictions on the proportion of the assets of an investor exposed to a single borrower 
or piece of real estate (where for insurers the latter may include the firm’s own offices). 
 
Meanwhile, a prudent person rule  is a concept whereby investments are made in such a way that they 
are considered to be handled “prudently” (as someone would do in the conduct of his or her own affairs). 
The aim is to thereby ensure adequate diversification, thus protecting the beneficiaries against insolvency 
of the sponsor and investment risks. For long term institutions, a prudent person rule would be naturally 
accompanied by an asset-liability management exercise, as outlined in Section 1.3. 
 
As discussed by Goldman (2000), the logic of the quantitative restriction or “prudent investment” 
approach is that prudence is equal to safety, where security of assets is measured instrument by 
instrument according to a fixed standard. The focus is placed on the investment itself. The overall risk of a 
life insurance or pension portfolio must not go beyond a certain level, while allowing for the desire of life 
companies or pension fund sponsors to be as competitive or low-cost as possible. This leads to a 
quantitative view of prudence which is focused on the idea that the investment itself can be tested as to 
whether or not the decision was prudent at the time. The model effectively tests the investment category, 
                                                                 
22 These limits do not, of course, apply to reserve funding pension systems such as those common in Japan, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden, where 100% of assets are invested in the sponsor. 
23  As discussed in Davis (2000), illegal self investment was at the root of the Maxwell scandal in the UK. 
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the asset class and the outcome of the investment. Such quantitative regulation of portfolio distributions 
entail limits on holdings of assets with relatively volatile nominal returns, low liquidity or high credit risk, 
such as equities, venture capital/unquoted shares and property, as well as foreign assets, even if their mean 
return is relatively high. The aim is to protect beneficiaries against insolvency of operators and investment 
risks, by ensuring adequate diversification of assets. On the other hand, explicit allowance is by definition 
not made for potentially offsetting correlations between types of financial instrument. It thereby overrides 
the free choice of investments which was assumed in Sections 1 and 2 above. It may be added that there 
is a strong link to the civil law tradition typical of Continental Europe, where rules are codified, rather than 
in the common law tradition of the Anglo Saxon countries. 
 
Meanwhile the prudent person rule is focused on the behaviour of the person concerned. The 
process of making the investment is the key test of prudence. More specifically, the test in this case is of 
the behaviour of the asset manager, the institutional investor and the process of decision making. It needs 
to be assessed whether, for example, there has been a thorough consideration of the issues, there is not 
blind reliance on experts and it is essential to have undertaken a form of “due diligence” investigation in 
forming the strategic asset allocation and prior to any change or variation to it. The institution would also be 
expected to have a coherent and explicit statement of investment principles.  
 
Whereas in general terms a prudent person approach is a standard that measures a course of conduct and 
not an investment outcome, such rules are often accompanied by an implicit or explicit presumption 
that diversification of investments is a key indicator of prudence in this sense. The prudent person 
rule, in effect, allows the free market to operate throughout the investment process while ensuing, along 
with solvency regulations, that there is both adequacy of assets and appropriate levels of risk. Rather than 
the focus being on the external rules, the onus is rather on internal controls and governance structures in 
which the authorities may have confidence. The authorities correspondingly require information on these 
aspects rather than purely focusing on the composition of the asset portfolio as is feasible with quantitative 
restrictions. Correspondingly, a wider degree of transparency is needed for the institutions (including in 
particular identification of lines of responsibility for decisions and of detailed practices of asset 
management). Such monitoring may however be delegated to self regulatory bodies, which have incentives 
to maintain compliance in order to protect the reputation of the industry and if there are forms of mutual 
insurance against losses. 
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It may be noted immediately that these polar extremes are rarely adopted, but often there is a degree 
of mixing of the two. Notably, prudent person rules are typically accompanied by a quantitative restriction 
on self investment, while some countries with asset restrictions also introduce concepts of maximising 
safety and profitability to their investment laws. Quantitative restrictions are rarely extended to require 
specific methods and targets for maturity matching. 
 
The general case against quantitative portfolio regulations  is put succinctly by European 
Commission (1999), namely that they are “in the way of optimisation of the asset allocation and security 
selection process and therefore may have led to suboptimal return and risk taking”. 
 
In more detail, and drawing on the discussion above, they: 
 
· prevent appropriate account being taken of the duration of the liabilities of an insurer or 
pension fund (which may differ sharply between companies and between funds, as well as over time), and 
related changes in risk aversion; 
· regulations may more generally render difficult or impossible the application of appropriate 
immunisation or asset-liability management techniques for maturity matching. This is because these 
may require sharp variations in the portfolio between equities to bonds, as well as use of derivatives; 
· in terms of risk and return optimisation, they are likely to enforce holdings of a portfolio below the 
efficient frontier, because they typically insist on high proportions of bonds and domestic assets; 
· they focus unduly on the risk and liquidity of individual assets and fail to take into account the 
fact that, at the level of the portfolio the default risk and price volatility can be reduced by diversification, 
while liquidity risk depends on the overall liquidity position of the investor and not the individual instruments 
which are held; 
· if portfolio regulations limit use of derivatives, abstracting from other operative limits, they will force 
the institution either to hold low-yielding assets - to the detriment of policy holders - or expose itself to 
unnecessary risks; 
· they are inflexible and cannot be changed rapidly in response to changing conjunctural economic 
circumstances and movements in securities, currency and real estate markets. The threat to some 
insurance companies from the fall in inflation, which has driven bond yields below policy guarantees made 
in an era of high inflation, are a case in point. Arguably, a more diversified portfolio with more “real 
assets” and hedging could have offered better protection. Again, whereas prudent person rules have 
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tended to date to accompany sizeable equity investments, there is no reason why asset managers should 
not shift wholesale to bonds if poor prospective equity returns made it prudent to do so; 
· they also may find it difficult to adapt to structural changes in financial asset markets such as the 
reduction in government bonds outstanding in the UK and US and the development of corporate bond 
markets in the euro area; 
· if enforced strictly, they may give incentives to asset managers to hold proportions of risky 
assets which fall well short of the limits, to avoid breaching them when markets perform well and 
prices rise; 
· they may encourage low levels of surplus assets , given the low returns on equity that they entail; 
· they encourage strategies to be conducted so as to conform with legal restrictions  rather than 
attaining good returns, reducing risk and other desirable objectives. Notably they may limit tactical asset 
allocation; 
· they encourage national governments to treat life insurers and pension funds as means to finance 
budgetary requirements, in a way that could not occur under a prudent person rule; 
· they reduce the extent to which the diversification benefits of international investment may 
be attained, and can even be said to expose policy holders to currency risk, given that they will want to 
spend some of their income on foreign goods and services, and the domestic currency may depreciate. 
Allowance for international investment is particularly important for a country with a small and undiversified 
capital market. If institutions are confined to domestic markets they may be subjected to unnecessary 
diversifiable risk, including major macroeconomic risks arising from “asymmetric shocks” to the domestic 
economy, that could otherwise be avoided. Foreign currency risk can be hedged if use of derivatives is 
permitted; 
· conversely, whereas investment regulations on domestic assets may seem appropriate in a small 
domestic market where there is high volatility and undiversifiable risk in equities, so as to ensure adequate 
diversification and portfolio liquidity, the widening and deepening of capital markets may make the 
regulations less necessary. The creation of EMU is a particularly relevant example  in this regard, given 
that a number of important Euro area countries maintain strict portfolio regulations (see Section 4.1); 
· portfolio regulations are less needed to bolster solvency in the case of policies which pass risk 
to the consumer, such as unit linked life policies and defined contribution pension funds. This is because 
there are no solvency risks for the provider. Prudent diversification is still warranted - but could be 
mandated by prudent person rules; 
· limits on exposures to single borrowers are unnecessary for the most part since diversification 
mandated by prudence would require small stakes in any case. 
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There may also be deleterious effects of portfolio regulations on the asset management industry: 
 
· there is no incentive for the institutional investor to nominate investment managers with skills to 
achieve higher return and lower risk by equity and international investment 
· competition among asset managers is discouraged if their main function is to meet quantitative 
asset restrictions 
· the development of the industry per se is likely to be set back, especially if entry by foreign 
managers is restricted24. 
 
The economy as a whole may also suffer: 
 
· quantitative restrictions may lead to inefficient allocation of capital and hence hold back economic 
growth and employment; 
· in particular, limits on unquoted shares and venture capital (including limits on the proportion of a firm’s 
equity that can be held) can hinder the dynamic small firm sector, which generate the bulk of new 
employment; 
· they increase costs for employers  where they are providing pensions or life insurance and hence 
hinder job creation 
 
Some possible exceptions  may be made to this argument, which may apply notably in emerging market 
economies: 
 
· there could be a rationale for portfolio regulations if fund managers as well as regulators25 are highly 
inexperienced and the markets volatile and open to manipulation by insiders. They in a sense ensure 
portfolio diversification in a rough and ready way, and avoid risk becoming excessive in such cases. A 
corollary is that restrictions may justifiably be eased as expertise develops; 
· this point applies more generally where regulators have doubts about internal controls in 
institutions, as well as in the industry’s capacity for self-regulation and related governance structures. 
Again, this justification will in many cases be temporary; 
                                                                 
24  The traditional lack of competitiveness of the Japanese asset management sector, low resultant asset returns, 
the consequences for the funding of pension funds and life insurers, and the benefits of deregulation of entry and 
portfolio regulations, are considered in Davis and Steil (2000). 
25  We detail in an Annex some of the requirements for appropriate regulation (see also Davis (1998b). 
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· compliance with portfolio limits is more readily verified and monitored by supervisors than for 
prudent person rules. The latter requires a high degree of transparency of institutions, and strict supervisory 
controls on investor malpractice (such as occurred in the Maxwell case) as well as on self-regulatory 
bodies. There may also be legal difficulties with enforcing prudent person regulations, e.g. in civil law 
countries; 
· the regulations may be used as a safeguard against imprudent companies, and as a signal to the 
market and consumers; 
· if they reduce insolvencies26, restrictions may reduce the need for an insurance fund that might 
otherwise lead to moral hazard; 
· correspondingly, governments may by use of asset restrictions seek to avoid bearing the burden of 
bailing out individuals from losses following imprudent investments in products such as personal 
pensions where the individual bears the risk; 
· following the general case above, regulation should become more liberal as financial markets 
become more sophisticated and mature, and should be reviewed frequently; 
· further issues arise in the context of capital outflow controls in developing countries. As noted by 
Fontaine (1997), exchange controls have in the past been - justifiably - imposed during foreign exchange 
crises to deal with capital flight, to avoid a sharp and costly overshooting of the currency, but often kept in 
looser form once normal conditions were re-established; 
· some countries also argue that restrictions are needed to boost development of domestic capital 
markets – but openness to foreign investment may also achieve this objective, while permitting international 
investment by institutional investments reduces  their exposure to diversifiable risk; 
· even in OECD countries, limits on self investment are appropriate to prevent concentration of risk; 
· meanwhile a difficulty with prudent person rules lies in the fact that court judgements (or 
desire to avoid litigation) may lead to narrow interpretations of risk and safety. For example, life 
and pension funds could protect themselves from liability by tilting their portfolios towards high quality 
assets that are easy to defend in court. Del Guercio (1996) finds some evidence of this in the US for banks 
running personal trusts and pension funds27. Of course, avoidance of individually high risk assets that could 
improve the overall risk and return profile of the portfolio may actually be contrary to beneficiary 
protection, which was the intention of prudent person rules.  
                                                                 
26  In practice, there is little evidence from OECD countries that insolvencies of life insurers and pension funds 
have been significantly higher with prudent person than with asset restrictions. 
27  She found that bank managers hold 31% of their equities in stocks of companies rated A+ by Standard and 
Poor’s while the corresponding figure for mutual funds is 15%. Alternative explanations to prudent-person rules for 
this behavior, namely passive indexing and limits in allowed portfolio positions, were rejected. 
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· Such interpretations may also encourage a focus on portfolio indexation. Indexing to narrow core 
market indices (such as the FTSE-100 and S and P 500) artificially drives up the value of the firms which 
are included and may increase the volatility of the investors’ assets. 
 
3.3 Prudent person versus portfolio restrictions for life insurance companies and pension 
funds  
 
We now go on to examine the case separately for life insurance companies and pension funds. It may be 
noted first that in order to protect insurance firms from insolvency in the shorter term, supervisory rules 
typically impose stricter regulations on assets backing technical provisions (i.e. guaranteed liabilities) than 
for the surplus (Dickinson 1998a). For example, a number of assets types are often forbidden to be held 
against technical provisions, but these restrictions typically do not apply to the surplus. This is also the case 
for the quantitative restrictions on asset holdings (i.e. in many countries they apply only to investments held 
against technical provisions and not to the surplus). Hence, the assets backing technical provisions are 
more likely to be invested in bonds, with only the surplus including a share of equities28. A similar issue 
arises for defined benefit pension funds, discussed below.  
 
On the other hand, the size of the surplus is itself affected by the degree of conservatism of the regulatory 
and accounting framework. For example, surplus calculations are affected by valuation methods (e.g. 
whether assets are valued at market value or book value) and discount rates used to calculate the present 
value of future liabilities. The undervaluation of the capital base may significantly increase the leverage of 
investment restrictions. Life company sectors having low discount rates and book value accounting for the 
assets tend to have smaller surpluses and correspondingly lower allocations to equities than those with high 
discount rates and market value accounting. 
 
The case in favour of quantitative portfolio restrictions may be put most strongly for life 
insurance companies which have nominally-fixed liabilities, especially if there are rights to early 
surrender. For such institutions, matching with assets of similar duration may indeed be a desirable portfolio 
strategy, as set out above, and a high degree of liquidity will be needed. This will be particularly the case 
for assets matching technical provisions. Hence portfolio regulations (which usually do not restrict bond 
holdings) may not strongly distort free-market portfolios.  
 
                                                                 
28  Shortfall risk considerations are likely to entail cautious investment or hedging for these assets also. 
 30
On the other hand, as argued by Dickinson (1998a), restrictions may make it more difficult to cope with 
some of the underlying risks of traditional life insurance business, notably interest rate risk on annuities and 
term policies, arising from the implicit interest rate guarantee implicit in the price of the contract. This can 
only be evaluated in the context of the asset and liability composition (immunisation characteristics) of the 
whole portfolio and not asset by asset. If there are strict investment restrictions, combined with restrictions 
on minimum premia, these may also give rise to economic inefficiency, as resulting low competition 
perpetuates a fringe of high cost firms (Rees and Kessner 1999). 
 
More generally, a competitive insurance market will involve firms seeking to earn higher rates of return on 
their financial assets in order to develop new products and compete with alternatives such as mutual funds. 
They may then seek to have a wider and more flexible choice of financial assets than regulations may 
allow, including taking advantage of the risk diversification, offered by international investment. As noted, 
even traditional liquidity risks can be handled at lower cost by use of derivatives. It can be argued that 
prudent person based diversification plus solvency rules (where the latter may include suitable stress tests, 
conservative valuation methods and/or risk based capital requirements) as well as comprehensive conduct 
of business rules to protect consumers are sufficient protection for policy holders without the overlay of 
asset restrictions, especially if the latter are imposed on an annual basis.  
 
This may be a particularly relevant argument for long term policies where any mismatched position can be 
corrected well before liabilities are due, and where appropriate asset-liability management techniques are 
undertaken. This argument applies even more strongly for the surplus over and above the level of technical 
provisions. Also assets corresponding to non-guaranteed liabilities (such as the bulk of variable -life or unit 
linked policies) are subject to inflation risk (as policyholders will anticipate a positive real rate of return on 
the policy). Such risks are minimised by investment in assets with real returns (indexed bonds, or in their 
absence international equities and real estate), which are often restricted by regulations Meanwhile, the 
restrictions on large exposures, while unnecessary in the context of diversification (since diversification 
would in any case lead to small stakes), may inhibit strategic stakes between insurance companies. 
 
The case for portfolio restrictions is much weaker for pension funds , where it may be noted that 
any portfolio restrictions often apply to the whole of the portfolio. Indeed, for advanced countries, apart 
from the control of self investment, the degree to which such regulations actually contribute to benefit 
security is open to doubt. This relates to the link of liabilities to average earnings growth (as well as the 
vulnerability of liabilities to regulatory changes). Since pension funds, unlike insurance companies, may face 
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the risk of increasing nominal liabilities as well as the risk of holding assets, they need to trade volatility 
with return29. Moreover, appropriate diversification of assets can eliminate any idiosyncratic risk from 
holding an individual security or type of asset, thus minimising the increase in risk. Again, if national cycles 
and markets are imperfectly correlated, international investment will reduce otherwise undiversifiable or 
"systematic" risk (see Davis 1995). In the case of restrictions which explicitly or implicitly30 oblige pension 
funds to invest in government bonds, which must themselves be repaid from taxation, there may be no 
benefit to capital formation and the "funded" plans may at a macroeconomic level be virtually equivalent to 
pay-as-you-go. Meanwhile, changes in duration depending on the maturity of a fund require marked shifts 
in portfolios. 
 
Even for defined contribution funds, it is hard to argue a sound case for such rules, given the superior 
alternative of prudent person rules. There seems little evidence that defined contribution investors need 
"protecting from themselves" i.e. prevented from taking high risks. Indeed, in practice, experience suggests 
that investors in individual defined contribution funds at least historically tend to be too cautious to develop 
adequate funds at retirement, while companies running defined contribution funds may invest excessively 
cautiously to avoid lawsuits. As noted, a case could be made (as in Chile, see Davis (1998b)) that a danger 
with unrestricted investments would be that firms providing pension contracts would seek to boost yield to 
attract clients, at a cost of excessive risk which could ultimately be borne by the government. But these 
tendencies could also be dealt with by a prudent person rule. 
 
Portfolio limits would, however, appear to be particularly inappropriate for defined benefit pensions, given 
the additional "buffer" of the company guarantee for the beneficiaries and risk sharing between older and 
younger workers, and if benefits must be indexed. Clearly, in such cases, portfolio regulations may affect 
the cost to companies of providing pensions, if it constrains managers in their choice of risk and return, 
forcing them to hold low yielding assets, and possibly increasing their risks and costs by limiting their 
possibilities of diversification31. Even solvency rules may not be essential if there is an appropriate actuarial 
and accounting framework32. 
 
                                                                 
29 Indeed, in several countries, a false parallel seems to be drawn by regulators between life insurers and 
pension funds. 
30 For example, by closing down all alternative investment strategies such as international diversification. 
31 As noted, portfolio restrictions are likely to prevent managers reaching the frontier of efficient portfolios, 
which indicates where return is maximised for a given risk. 
32  See the discussion of the pre-1995 regime in the UK in Davis (2000). 
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In our view a very poor argument for portfolio regulation of pension funds - but nevertheless one which is 
occasionally heard - is the need for a level playing field in terms of competition between life insurance 
and pension funds. In our view the differences between types of liabilities are sufficiently radical to offset 
this, and one could also question whether there is in fact direct competition, given pension fund membership 
is typically compulsory as part of the contract of employment, while purchase of life insurance is voluntary. 
At most, it is only the pension contracts offered by life companies that compete directly. 
 
4 National experience 
 
In this final section we compare the types of restrictions set in a number of OECD countries and make a 
preliminary evaluation of the effects they have had on portfolios and investment performance. 
 
4.1 Comparing asset regulations of insurance and pension funds in nine OECD countries 
 
Table 5 provides an impression of the types of restrictions which hold in a number of key OECD 
countries33. We seek to compare pension and life insurance regulation directly, which leads to a number of 
relevant observations. 
 
Concerning the overall approach to investment regulation, following the evaluation of OECD (2000), 
prudent person rules are much more common for pension funds than for insurance companies. Only the 
UK, US and the Netherlands have prudent person rules for both types of institution. Canada, Finland, Italy 
and Japan have prudent person rules for pension funds and not for life insurers, while in Germany and 
Sweden neither sector has prudent person rules. This predominance for life insurance is consistent with the 
suggestion above that quantitative restrictions may be more suited to this sector by the nature of the 
liabilities than for pension funds. 
 
Both types of regulation are often accompanied by diversification rules. These tend to be more stringent 
for life insurers than pension funds, with the latter often having a general requirement to diversify (as in the 
UK, US, Finland and the Netherlands) while life insurers’ diversification rules are generally quantitative, 
even in the Netherlands and the United States where there is also a prudent person rule. Where both types 
of institution are subject to quantitative diversification rules, the limits are often lower for life insurance than 
for pension funds, as in Sweden (10% large exposure limit for pension funds and 5% for insurers), or Italy 
                                                                 
33  Source: OECD (2000). 
 33
(where the figures are 15% and 5% respectively). There are also maturity matching requirements for life 
insurers in Finland, the Netherlands and the UK - no country imposes maturity matching on pension funds 
perhaps partly because there are no assets which explicitly match such long liabilities. 
 
Quantitative restrictions on domestic assets  are naturally more detailed where they form the basis of 
asset regulation than where they do not, (i.e. a prudent person rule operates). They are not, however, 
absent in all cases of prudent person rules, as for Canadian pension funds (where real estate is limited to 
5%) and Finnish pension funds (where an array of restrictions is imposed, perhaps casting into doubt the 
classification of the overall sector regulation as based on prudent person). Comparing quantitative 
restrictions between life insurance and pension funds, we see that in some countries they are tighter for 
pension funds than for life insurers, as in Finland and Germany (where the limit for shares is lower for 
pension funds). It could again be questioned whether this is in line with the differing nature of liabilities. 
These cases are however exceptional, and elsewhere the life insurers tend to have more onerous 
quantitative restrictions. Only the Netherlands and the UK have no restrictions on share holding for life 
insurers, whereas only Finland, Germany and Sweden (at a very high level) limit the share holdings of 
pension funds. Unquoted shares, real estate and loans are also commonly restricted for life insurers. The 
UK has no restrictions at all on domestic asset holdings, except for a 3% cash limit for life insurers. Note 
that in Canada, Japan and the US, life insurance regulations apply to all assets of the company, whereas in 
the EU the restrictions only apply to investments against technical provisions. It has been suggested in 
Section 2.1 above that the latter if perhaps more appropriate, as the surplus and free capital correspond to 
the equity of the firm and not to its liabilities. 
 
Concerning self investment, this is typically banned for life insurers altogether, while for pension funds it 
is typically limited to 10% (whether or not there are prudent person rules), to protect against insolvency of 
the sponsor. Finland is unusual in that the maximum is 30%. US defined contribution funds and Japanese 
funds also have no limits, as is also the case for German and Japanese book-reserve pensions. Only for a 
few countries are there ownership concentration limits for unrelated firms, as in Canada and Sweden 
(these rules seek to prevent concentration of power in corporate governance rather than avoiding 
insolvency of the institutional investor). 
 
As regards foreign asset restrictions , these tend to be more stringent for life insurers than pension 
funds, in line with the nature of the liabilities. There are typically two types, namely matching limits that 
usually apply to investments against technical provisions, and overall restrictions which apply to the 
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portfolio as a whole. This is even the case where both pension funds and life insurers have prudent person 
rules, where Netherlands, UK and US life insurers are indeed subject either to currency matching or 
foreign asset restrictions, while pension funds have no restrictions. Finnish “prudent person rules” for 
pension funds entail a currency matching limit and even more stringent limits on foreign asset holdings, and 
a separate limit on holdings in “other EU states”. In some countries, pension fund rules are more restrictive 
than those for life insurers, which is a paradox given the longer-duration and wage linked nature of the 
liabilities. An example is Canada where there are no limits for life insurers but pension funds have a foreign 
asset maximum of 20%. In Germany, pension funds again appear to have a stricter limit, with a 6% limit on 
foreign investment which is not present for life insurers. It may be added that EU life insurance sectors 
take the common Third Life EU Directive rules (80% matching in particular), with similar rules applying to 
Finnish and German pension funds. 
 
This section has shown that in general pension fund asset regulation is lighter than life insurance, with 
prudent person rules being more common, while quantitative regulations which apply tend to be easier. This 
is consistent with the argument presented in Section 3, that portfolio restrictions are more appropriate - or 
at least less damaging - for life insurers than for pension funds. There are some exceptions, as in Canada, 
Germany and Finland, where pension funds face tougher restrictions for some or all asset types. 
 
4.2 Assessment of portfolios in the light of asset restrictions and other influences 
 
We set out to consider how sector portfolios differ, depending on whether there are quantitative 
restrictions, as well as seeing whether the restrictions actually bind. We also note some other key 
influences on portfolios. Tables 6 and 7 present data for end-1998, derived from various sources, on the life 
insurance and pension fund sectors in the countries noted above, together with France. 
 
Taking the countries together on average, portfolios with prudent person rules have fewer bonds, 
more equities and foreign assets than those with quantitative restrictions. The differences for 
domestic assets are slightly greater for pension funds than for life insurance, and markedly so for foreign 
assets. Such a contrast would be much greater if the countries which have recently switched to a prudent 




Tables 8 and 9 shows some tentative estimates of the degree to which constraints on portfolios bind. 
For pension funds, German, Canadian and Swedish limits on foreign assets are close to being attained, as 
well as Canadian limits on property. Elsewhere average portfolios fall well short of limits. For life insurers, 
it will be recalled that restrictions in the EU tend to apply to assets backing technical provisions. Foreign 
asset limits (for all insurance companies) are breached in Sweden probably for this reason. Similarly, the 
overshoot shown for the US reflects the fact that only some states, following New Jersey, impose a 15% 
limit. Equity limits seem tight in Canada and Sweden, and foreign currency limits in the UK. Elsewhere 
there is considerable headroom. Note that the interpretation of headroom could be on the one hand that 
there is no effect of the restrictions on normal business - or on the other that the existence of such 
restrictions may lead to very cautious portfolio management to avoid ever breaching them even if markets 
soar. The distinction is hard to test. Caution in portfolios may also link to accounting and solvency limits, as 
discussed below. 
 
A few further remarks may be relevant. Whereas portfolio restrictions are aimed to prevent 
overconcentration of risk in individual assets, portfolio regulations may operate contrary to this; Swedish 
pension funds, for example, have considerable exposure to housing markets via mortgage related bonds, 
and loans to housing credit institutions. Together with mortgages, these amounted to no less than 35% of 
Swedish funds' assets in 1998. These imply a sizeable exposure to potential effects of recession and falling 
house prices. Even countries with “prudent person rules” may not leave equity investment entirely 
unrestricted. Trzcinka (1998) maintains that US defined benefit fund managers target a fixed income ratio 
of around 40% owing to the prudent person rule (although the minimum funding regulation may be more 
influential). Davis (1995) reports that Dutch funds were at least till the early 1990s subject to unofficial 
tolerance limits for equity exposure of 30%, imposed by the supervisors. 
 
Also of interest is the econometric results of Davis (1988) of the scope of tactical asset allocation for 
life insurers and pension funds in the US, UK, Germany, Japan and Canada. These estimates showed that 
changing portfolios are strongly influenced by relative asset returns (implying tactical asset allocation) 
where there are few regulations governing portfolio distributions and low transactions costs, as in the US 
and UK. Adjustment to a change in such returns in these countries is generally rapid. Assuming adequate 
information and appropriate incentives to fund managers, this should imply an efficient allocation of funds 
and correct valuation of securities. In Davis' research, these results did not all hold where transactions 
costs are high and portfolio regulations are strict - e.g., in Germany, Japan and Canada. In these countries 
adjustment to a change in returns is somewhat slower, implying that portfolios are relatively invariant to 
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changes in asset market conditions. These estimates illustrate a certain inflexibility of portfolios to market 
conditions when portfolio restrictions apply. These could apply either directly owing to the limits 
themselves, or indirectly if portfolio regulations promote a cautious and uncompetitive asset management 
sector. 
 
We now go on to note some other influences on portfolios which may complement, interact with or 
override those of portfolio regulations: 
 
· solvency and minimum funding rules and their interaction with associated accounting arrangements 
may play a crucial role in influencing portfolios, and may account for the non binding nature of the portfolio 
restrictions themselves. This is because they determine the size and volatility of the surplus, as well as 
defining the rules for dealing with a corresponding deficit. They hence influence the likelihood and cost of 
any deficiency, and hence the importance for life insurers and pension funds of maintaining a stable 
valuation of assets relative to liabilities, independent of portfolio limits.  
 
For example, as noted by Dickinson (1998a), there is some evidence “that actuarial asset/liability valuations 
have inhibited life insurance companies investment polic ies…putting greater concern on the short term 
investment positions when the real investment risks facing life insurance companies are essentially long 
term”, thus inhibiting investment in securities with volatile prices such as company shares. He notes that 
such rigor in respect of solvency is particularly unnecessary where there are no high guaranteed surrender 
values on policies. Similar arguments can be made in respect of defined benefit poension funds, which are 
widely subject to strict minimum funidng rules (Davis 1998a). 
 
· minimum rates of return set annually by regulation can constrain diversification even when 
quantitative limits are not stringent (OECD 2000). This is because they limit holdings of volatile assets 
which could reduce returns below the limit in one year, even if they offer a high mean return; 
 
· as regards accounting standards, application of accounting principles which insist on positive net 
worth of the fund at all times, carry equities on the balance sheet at the lower of book value and market 
value and calculate returns net of unrealised capital gains (as in Germany and Switzerland) restrain equity 
holdings by life insurers and pension funds independently of the portfolio regulations (see Hepp 1992). 
 
· liabilities have a major influence, for example on the share of bonds, in that: 
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inflation sensitivity of liabilities will determine the demand for assets acting as inflation hedges such as 
index linked bonds, as well as assets whose return is unaffected by inflation such as real estate and 
equities; nominal liabilities require only money fixed assets; 
the need for cash flow will play an important role by determining the need for liquidity to meet (known or 
uncertain) cash flows, for example in the context of growing maturity of pension funds, and policy 
loans/early surrender for life insurers; 
duration of liabilities in combination with the strictness of minimum funding and solvency rules will set a 
benchmark for the duration of assets - or if they are not matched, to the scope of interest rate risk; 
Note that besides differing between countries, these factors will differ strongly between individual life 
companies and pension funds. 
 
· higher taxation on bonds than equities makes the former an attractive investment to tax-exempt 
investors such as pension funds  
 
· ownership and control of pension funds may influence portfolios, via the degree of risk aversion of 
those controlling the fund and the degree to which those holding residual risks (i.e. benefiting from a 
surplus or funding a deficit) can control asset distributions. Similar differences may exist between mutual 
and listed insurance companies, where the latter may be more aggressive in risk taking. 
 
· concerning international diversification, in small countries the assets of institutional investors may 
exceed the entire domestic equity market, and hence simple liquidity considerations necessitate 
international investment, abstracting from risk/return considerations, if regulations permit.  
 
· the structure of insurance and asset management markets and related levels of competition is 
likely to impact on the efficiency of investment. In particular, protection of fund managers from external 
competition may lead to a sub-optimal investment strategy from the point of view of beneficiaries with low 
yielding assets held as well as high commissions charged; 
 
· whereas in principle capital market activity should ensure that asset returns are equalised across 
countries, owing to international investment restrictions, exchange controls etc. this has not always been 
the case in the past, resulting in markedly different real returns on assets (Table 1). In this context, 
inter country differences in strategic bond holding may also relate to asset returns.  
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· financial structure  more generally may have an important role to play. In traditionally bank-dominated 
economies where capital markets play a subordinate role, it is loans that often dominate the portfolios of 
long term institutional investors. 
 
4.3 Returns on life insurance and pension fund portfolios 
 
In order to assess the effects of portfolio regulations more directly, we estimated the returns on life 
insurers’ and pension funds’ portfolios, using aggregate data for the respective sectors in seven of the 
nine countries considered in Section 4.1. This was done by weighting the various components of the asset 
portfolio by the annual total holding period returns (including capital gains or losses)34 obtained on the 
corresponding instruments in the market. The implicit assumption is that the institutions are holding the 
index portfolio35 in each instrument, while transactions and administrative costs, which would otherwise act 
to reduce returns, are disregarded. Clearly, this is a simplistic exercise and conclusions should be drawn 
cautiously. In particular, following the discussion in Section 1, the degree to which the (nominal or real) 
return and the standard deviation alone can be used to assess the optimality of portfolio choices is limited, 
given that the nature of the liabilities may justify some alternative approaches to investment (such as 
immunisation or shortfall risk minimisation) not focused on risk and return alone. Note also that we are 
mainly testing the efficacy of strategic asset allocation, and to a lesser extent tactical asset allocation but 
not security selection - although the latter may also be affected by portfolio regulations. 
 
Data for life insurers are only available for the period since 1980, so for comparison we show the data for 
pension funds over the same period. This is rather shorter than is ideal, since it covers mainly a period of 
falling inflation and favourable market returns, that may not be typical of experience over longer periods. 
We include as a memo item longer term returns for pension fund sectors (derived in Davis and Steil 2000).  
 
With these caveats in mind, we present the results in Tables 10 and 11. We focus on average real 
annual returns  as the most relevant comparison, given the varying inflation rates between the countries 
concerned. Pension fund sectors are shown on average to have similar real returns to life insurance 
                                                                 
34  For some investors, holding period returns on bonds will be less relevant than redemption yields, e.g. when 
they are to be held to maturity. But this would not be in line with a market value basis for accounting – which is itself 
arguably most relevant for profitability and solvency. 
35  In practice there are vast differences between individual funds and companies in the returns they provide. 
As an illustration, Blake (2000b) shows that there is  for example a 4.1 percentage point difference in the UK equity 
growth mutual fund sector between the top and bottom quartiles, and 5.9 percentage points for smaller companies. If 
sustained for 40 years, such performance could lead to accumulated funds 3.2 and 5.3 times larger for choosing the 
top rather than the bottom quartile. 
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sectors, despite the difference in liabilities discussed in Section 2. The sectors with prudent person rules 
have higher returns than those with restrictions, both for life insurance and pension funds. The average 
difference between prudent person and restrictions is however greater for pension funds - of the order of 
200 basis points as compared with 90 basis points for life insurers. Hence, the relative impact of portfolio 
regulations appears to be greater for pension funds than life insurers, consistent with the arguments 
presented above which suggested they may be less appropriate for pension funds. In effect, if we assume 
that sectors with prudent person rules are optimising, the loss of returns arising from quantitative 
restrictions is implied to be much less for life insurers than for pension funds. 
 
While comparing sectors with prudent person rules, the average annual return for pension funds is 30-50 
basis points above those for life insurers. This is consistent with the stronger link of liabilities to real 
earnings for pension funds, which would necessitate higher returns. For countries with restrictions, the 
returns are lower for pension funds than for life insurers by 80 bp. This is a large difference, which is not 
consistent with the differing nature of liabilities. As regards risk, the data suggest that the volatility of real 
returns for countries with asset restrictions is actually higher than with prudent person rules. (This is 
however largely a consequence of high volatility in Sweden.) 
 
The 1970-95 data for pension funds, included as a memo item, suggests that the difference between 
prudent person and restrictions is rather less over a longer period - around 80-100 basis points. Meanwhile, 
the standard deviations are higher for prudent person, as might be anticipated. These outturns show that 
superior returns by prudent person sectors are not just a quirk of the 1980-95 data period. 
 
Besides looking at absolute real returns, it is also relevant to compare realised returns with 
benchmarks. Are life companies and pension funds optimising given the opportunities, which may differ 
markedly between countries? Two benchmarks are proposed, first the returns on a portfolio with 50-50 
domestic equities and bonds, and second a global portfolio of 50-50 international bonds and equities, 
distributed across the other markets with rough GDP weights. We also look at the returns on pension funds 
relative to average earnings, given an excess of returns over average earnings growth is essential to the 
viability of pension funds. The returns on the benchmarks are shown in Table 12. It is shown that there are 
marked cross-country differences over 1980-95, despite the ongoing global integration of capital markets. 
The annual real domestic returns vary from 10.4% in Germany to 6.6% in Canada. The global returns are 
more comparable, but still vary somewhat owing to the differing experience of exchange rate depreciation. 
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They vary from 10.4% in Sweden to 9.3% in Germany. Note that in many cases a global portfolio offers a 
better risk/return trade-off than a domestic one. 
 
Looking at the comparison of the portfolio returns with the benchmarks, it is evident that sectors do not 
always profit fully from the available opportunities. This is notably the case for Japan, the Netherlands 
and Sweden (for domestic assets) and Sweden (for the global portfolio), where returns are more than 400 
basis points below a 50-50 portfolio of bonds and equities. On the other hand, risks on the institutional 
sectors’ portfolios are generally lower than for the benchmarks, reflecting wider diversification. Looking at 
the averages for different types of portfolio regulations, the results are revealing. For life insurers there 
is rather little differe nce between prudent person and quantitative restrictions in the average shortfall for 
a 50-50 domestic portfolio, which is 2.2% for pension funds and 2.7% for life insurance. There is an 80 
basis point lower shortfall for prudent person sectors on a global portfolio. In contrast, for pension funds 
there are major differences. For a 50-50 domestic portfolio the difference in the shortfall between 
prudent person and quantitative restrictions is no less than 280 basis points, and 220 for the global portfolio. 
The excess over average earnings, whole it is adequate on average during this bull market for both sectors, 
is nevertheless 2 percentage points higher for prudent person sectors. 
 
Despite all the caveats that were introduced at the beginning of this section, one conclusion is clear, namely 
that pension fund sectors with quantitative restrictions tend to suffer much more relative to 
prudent person sectors than do life sectors with restrictions . Over 1980-95 there was not even an 
offsetting benefit in terms of risk reduction, if one focuses on the volatility of real holding-period returns. 
Given liabilities are not greatly dissimilar across countries for pension sectors, this indicates that portfolio 
restrictions raise costs unduly and are damaging to employee retirement security. In contrast the 
restrictions appear to be less damaging for life companies, although some reduction in return is apparent for 




Summarising the main points of the paper, we have seen that there are a number of paradigms of 
investment which imply differing strategic and tactical asset allocation, and a varying importance of risk 
and return per se as a criterion for performance. Meanwhile equities and international assets are shown to 
be higher risk than domestic government bonds, but also offer a disproportionately higher return. There are 
strong arguments for the benefits of international diversification in terms of risk reduction, especially for 
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countries with small and volatile domestic capital markets. Turning to the long term institutional sectors, the 
nature of liabilities are the key to understanding appropriate investments of life insurance companies and 
pension funds. There are a number of fundamental differences between the two types of institution which 
make it unlikely that identical asset regulations will be appropriate; in particular, pension funds are likely to 
have a returns-benchmark of average earnings, while life companies need at most to seek to beat inflation. 
Varying duration of pension liabilities - and difficulty of matching with a single asset class - may 
necessitate major shifts from one asset category to another over time, and major differences between 
funds at any given time. Life insurers are better able to control the duration of liabilities via the mix of 
policies sold. 
 
Turning to regulatory issues, the overall case for regulation of institutional investors is strong, but also there 
are a wide range of potential regulations, some of which may substitute for others. In terms of portfolio 
regulations, both prudent person regulations and quantitative restrictions seek principally to ensure 
diversification, albeit by differing routes. The former focuses on the process of investment, while the latter 
focuses on the individual instruments held. There are strong arguments in terms of financial economics for 
a prudent person rule for institutional investors, especially if it is combined with appropriate solvency 
regulations and limits on self investment. The case is particularly strong for pension funds. There are major 
differences between OECD countries in terms of the actual approach adopted; in some countries, the rules 
vary markedly between life insurance and pension funds, while in other cases identical rules apply, even 
though liabilities may differ. In most countries it is life regulations which are tighter than those for pension 
funds, although this is not universal. 
 
The actual portfolios of life insurance companies and pension funds in OECD countries reflect a number of 
factors in addition to the portfolio restrictions and hence the effect of the restrictions is not easily 
evaluated; on the other hand, a general tendency can be discerned for sectors facing prudent person rules 
to have a grater share of equities and foreign assets. Constraints vary in the degree to which they bind, but 
this need not mean that the restrictions have no effect on portfolios. Finally, returns on pension fund sectors 
are similar on average to life insurers, while the variance of returns between pension fund sectors with 
prudent person and portfolio regulations are greater than for life insurers. 
 
We suggest that the key points for policy purposes are that prudent person rules are generally preferable to 
quantitative restrictions for pension funds, except in certain specific circumstances which may arise notably 
in emerging market economies. Even if such circumstances currently hold (e.g. inexperienced regulators 
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and poorly developed regulatory structures), quantitative restrictions should not in our view be seen as 
desirable in the long term. Rather, there needs to be a modernisation of such frameworks, which would in 
turn make implementation of prudent person regulations feasible. Meanwhile asset restrictions are less 
damaging for life insurance than for pension funds. Since liabilities and associated risks differ markedly 
between life insurers and pension funds, there is not in our view a strong case for identical regulations. 
Nevertheless, prudent person rules may be desirable in certain cases also for life insurers, particularly in 
competitive sectors in advanced countries – and for pension contracts offered by life insurance companies. 
 
Appropriate strategies of deregulation will thus address pension funds first, with an early introduction of 
prudent person regulations. For life insurers, the choice is less urgent, although it can be argued that 
prudent person rules become more appropriate, the more competitive the life sector is and the greater the 
share of variable as opposed to nominal fixed products. Even investment for nominal fixed products may be 
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Australia 4.8 1.9 8.3 -0.1 3.4 1.8 4.4 7.5 4.4 
 5.2 22.4 19.9 18.5 4.2 4.3 18.7 20.7 17.8 
Canada 4.2 3.3 5.0 2.0 5.5 2.7 9.4 8.2 5.1 
 3.1 12.9 15.8 13.3 2.9 3.3 8.3 17.8 15.0 
Denmark 6.6 5.3 5.9 4.4 6.2 2.3    5.2 2.1 
 3.5 12.2 25.6 19.1 3.5 2.8    21.4 17.7 
France 3.3 3.2 7.7 2.5 4.0 2.9 4.3 6.9 3.8 
 3.3 16.2 18.4 15.8 2.5 3.4 14.5 17.2 14.5 
Germany 6.8 4.4 10.8 3.9 4.7 3.1 10.9 5.5 2.4 
 2.0 15.4 23.8 15.7 1.4 2.1 11.5 21.4 17.4 
Italy 4.3  4.1 -2.0  -0.3  7.9 4.9 
 3.7  32.5 20.8  4.4  16.3 14.5 
Japan 1.4 3.4 8.5 3.1 2.7 -0.2 11.5 7.8 4.4 
 4.7 16.3 20.9 19.5 4.7 4.5 19.4 20.4 12.8 
Netherlands 4.0 2.8 8.8 2.6 4.4 2.1 5.9 6.2 3.1 
 3.4 16.1 26.6 14.1 2.4 3.8 8.3 18.7 13.9 
Sweden 4.4 1.7 14.1 1.4 4.3 2.1 10.3 7.7 4.6 
 3.8 15.3 31.4 16.3 3.3 3.9 27.1 17.6 15.4 
Switzerland 2.8 0.4 7.8 0.0 1.6 1.3 1.7 5.3 2.2 
 2.0 20.3 22.8 18.7 2.2 2.0 9.1 19.9 15.9 
United Kingdom 1.7 2.1 8.3 1.0 2.7 2.1 1.5 8.0 4.1 
  6.1 14.7 17.8 14.9 5.1 4.6 15.3 17.7 15.7 
United States 3.8 1.7 6.2 1.2 4.7 2.0 5.6 8.5 5.5 
 2.3 13.0 14.8 15.2 2.9 2.3 22.1 18.7 14.9 
Average real 
return 




3.6 15.9 22.5 16.8 3.2 3.4 15.4 19.0 15.4 
Source: Davis and Steil (2000) 
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Table 2: Inflation and real average earnings growth (mean and standard 
deviation) 
 
 Inflation Real 
average 
earnings 
Australia 7.3 1.4 
 3.9 3.4 
Canada 5.7 1.5 
 3.4 2.3 
Denmark 7.1 2.6 
 3.5 3.4 
France 6.3 2.9 
 4.2 2.4 
Germany 3.5 3.0 
 1.9 2.8 
Italy 9.4 3.3 
 5.9 4.4 
Japan 4.7 3.5 
 5.1 3.7 
Netherlands 4.6 1.6 
 2.9 2.6 
Sweden 7.7 1.5 
 3.0 3.5 
Switzerland 3.9 1.7 
 2.4 2.0 
United Kingdom 8.1 2.8 
 5.4 2.2 
United States 5.5 -0.1 
 3.0 1.8 
   
Average 6.2 2.1 
Standard deviation 3.7 2.9 
Source, Davis and Steil (2000), own calculations. 
 
Table 3:  Performance of global stock indices: 1921-96 (%) 
 
Index Real return 
(arithmetic)  
Standard deviation  Real return 
(geometric) 
USA 5.5 15.8 4.3 
Non-USA 3.8  3.4 
Global 5.0 12.1 4.3 
Survived 
markets 
4.6 11.1 4.0 
Source:  Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) 
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Table 4: Principal regulations for life insurance companies and pension funds  
 
Abbreviations: LI Life insurance contracts; PP Defined Contribution Personal Pensions, DB Defined Benefit Pension 
Funds, DC Defined Contribution Pension Funds 
 









Are portfolios of life insurance companies and 
pension funds adequately diversified and 




PPR or QR) 
Yes- Both DB 
and DC 









Yes Yes- DB Monopoly/ 
asymmetric 
information 
Who should benefit from assets accumulated 





Yes Yes – DB Fiscal/equity 






Yes in highly 
regulated 
markets 
Yes – DC Monopoly/ 
Fiscal 
Should individuals and companies be obliged 
to have private pension schemes or life 
insurance? 
Membership Not LI – 
possibly PP 
Yes – Both 
DB and DC 
Moral 
hazard/fiscal 
Should annuities be inflation-indexed? Indexation/ 
contract 
design 
Yes – PP 
only 
Yes – Both 
DB and DC 
Monopoly 
Should private pensions or life insurance be an 
addition or partly a substitute for social 
security? 
Integration Not LI – 
possibly PP 
Yes – Both 
DB and DC 
Fiscal 
Should individuals be forced to take annuities 
from life insurance companies , or are lump 
sums acceptable? 




Should rights under life insurance or pension 
benefits be insured? 
Insurance Yes, in 
liberalised 
markets 





Can losses on pension funds be avoided when 
individuals change job, or when individuals 
wish to shift their assets between life 
insurance companies? 
Portability Yes – for PP 
– not LI 





Should there be controls on the distribution of 





Yes in highly 
regulated 
markets 










Yes Yes – Both 




What information is essential for members to 
judge the soundness of life insurance 












Yes Yes – Both 




Table 5: Portfolio regulations for pension funds and life insurance companies 
 
CANADA 





domestic assets  







PPR, maximum 10% in 
liabilities of one 
company 
Real estate limit to 5% Maximum 10% self 
investment; maximum 
30% of shares of one 
company 
No currency matching 
limit but foreign 
assets maximum of 
20% of fund 
Life insurance 
(maxima 
applied to all 
assets) 
No PPR 5-25% in real estate 
and stocks combined; 
10% in non mortgage 
loans 
(Non life : 25% in 





No currency matching 










domestic assets  







PPR, assets to be 
diversified and 
decentralised 
Maximum 30% in 
shares, 5% unquoted 
shares, 50% mortgage 
loans, 40% real estate 
Maximum 30% self 
investment. 
80% currency 
matching limit, 5% in 
foreign currency, 20% 









No PPR, EU 
diversification rules 
(10% maximum of 
technical reserves in 
one piece of real 
estate, 5% shares and 
5% loans of one 
borrower), maturity 
matching rules apply 
Maximum 50% in 
domestic shares, 10% 
unquoted shares, 
40% real estate, 40% 
mortgage loans, 50% 
in secured non 
mortgage loans or 








OECD shares limited 
to 25%, technical 
reserves must be 
covered by real estate 
in Finland, securities 
issued by residents or 









domestic assets  







No PPR, deposits 
with single credit 
institution limited to 
2% 
20-25% in equities 
and 15-25% in 
property 
Maximum 10% self 
investment 
80% currency 
matching limit; 5% of 
premium reserve, 20% 
of other restricted 










No PPR, EU 
diversification rules 
(10% maximum of 
technical reserves in 
one piece of real 
estate, 5% shares and 
5% loans of one 
borrower) 
Maximum 30% quoted 
shares, 10% 
unquoted shares, 
25% real estate, 50% 
in loans, 30% mutual 





matching limit overall; 
5% of premium 
reserve and 20% of 
other restricted assets  
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ITALY 













PPR, debt and equity 
of one issuer limited 
to 15% of fund 
Maximum 20% 
liquidity and 20% in 
closed end funds 
20% in one company 
or 30% for multiple 
sponsors. May not 
hold more than 25% 
of a closed end 
fund’s assets  
Minimum 33% 
matching. Securities 
of OECD countries 
not traded in 
regulated markets 
limited to 50%; non 
OECD securities 
traded in regulated 
markets limited to 5% 











No PPR, EU 
diversification rules 
(10% maximum of 
technical reserves in 
one piece of real 
estate, 5% shares of 
one borrower and 5% 
loans of one 
borrower) 
Maximum 20% quoted 
shares, 20% 
unquoted shares, 
50% real estate, 50% 
mortgage loans. Non 
mortgage loans 
prohibited (Non-life: 
35% real estate and 





matching limit overall; 
20% may be held in 
foreign shares and 
50% in other foreign 
securities (Non-life, 
10% in foreign shares 









domestic assets  












to all assets) 
No PPR, 10% limit on 
debt or equity 
exposures to one 
borrower 
Maximum 30% shares, 
20% real estate, 10% 
non-mortgage loans, 
10% corporate bonds, 
30% mutual funds 
(mortgage loans 




rules apply for foreign 
companies 
No matching rules, 
30% limit on foreign 
currency assets  
Note: rules for pension funds apply to Employee Pension Funds, while Tax Qualified Pension Funds bear no 
investment restrictions. Both EPFs and TQPPs were subject to quantitative restrictions till the late 1990s. 
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NETHERLANDS 





domestic assets  












required by sectors, 
countries and 
currencies 
None Self investment 
limited to 5%, except 
for surplus assets 










PPR, , EU 
diversification rules 
(10% maximum of 
technical reserves in 
one piece of real 
estate, 5% shares of 
one borrower and 5% 
loans of one 
borrower); maturity 
matching rules apply 
Maximum 8% in 
unsecured loans, 10% 
in real estate and 3% 
in cash (Non-life: 5% 














domestic assets  







No PPR, investment 
in one company 
limited to 10% 
Maximum 60% to be 
held in shares 
Self investment 
limited to 10% 
Maximum 5% of 




Foreign assets limited 









No PPR, Maximum 5% 
in a single item of real 
estate and for 
exposures to a single 
borrower 
Maximum 25% in 
shares, 25% in real 
estate and mortgage 
loans together, 50% 
in corporate bonds 







20% of technical 
reserves in foreign 
currency and foreign 
securities; overall 









domestic assets  








limit to DC funds 
Maximum 10% in any 
one mutual fund and 
25% in funds run by 
one manager. 
Self investment is 
limited to 5% 
None 
Life insurance PPR, maturity 
matching required 










domestic assets  










None Self investment 





to all assets) 
PPR, per-issuer 
limitation of 3-5% of 
issues other than US 
government 
Imposed at state 
level, e.g. Delaware 
250% of capital and 
surplus in shares, 
25% in real estate, 
50% in mortgage 
loans (Non-life 40% in 
shares) New Jersey 
15% in shares, 10% 
real estate, 60% 
mortgages (Non-life 
5% real estate and 
40% mortgage loans) 
 No currency matching 
rule; aggregate limits 
on foreign assets of 
0-10% imposed at 




Sources OECD (2000), Dickinson (1998) 
Table 6: Pension funds’ portfolio composition 1998 
 




Property Foreign assets  
UK  4 0 14 52 3 18 
US 4 1 21 53 0 11 
Germany 0 33 43 10 7 7 
Japan 5 14 34 23 0 18 
Canada 5 3 38 27 3 15 
France 0 18 65 10 2 5 
Italy 0 1 35 16 48 0 
Netherlands 2 10 21 20 7 42 
Sweden 0 0 64 20 8 8 
Finland 13 0 69 9 7 2 
Average 3 8 40 24 9 13 
Prudent person 5 4 33 29 10 15 
Restrictions 0 17 57 13 6 7 
Sources: National flow of funds balance sheets, Mercer (1999). In Tables 6-13, the categories “prudent person” 
and “restrictions” reflect the classification in Table 5. 
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Table 7:  Life insurers' portfolio composition 1998 
 




Property Foreign assets  
UK  5 1 25 48 6 13 
US 6 8 52 26 0 1 
Germany 1 57 14 17 4 0 
Japan 5 30 36 10 0 9 
Canada 7 28 55 26 7 3 
France 1 2 74 15 7 0 
Italy 0 1 75 12 2 0 
Netherlands 1 29 24 24 5 10 
Sweden 4 2 35 27 5 27 
Finland 1 61 0 21 12 0 
Average 3 22 39 23 5 6 
Prudent person 4 13 33 33 4 8 
Restrictions 3 26 41 18 5 6 
Source: National flow of funds balance sheets, OECD. Data for Sweden cover all insurance companies  
 
 
Table 8: Pension funds’ shortfall relative to main portfolio restrictions  
 
percent Equities Property Foreign assets  
Germany 15 18 -1 
Canada  2 5 
Italy   33 
Sweden 40  2 
Finland 26 33 18 
 
 
Table 9: Life insurers’ shortfall relative to main portfolio restrictions  
 
percent Equities Property Foreign assets  
UK      7 
US -11 25 9 
Germany 23 21 20 
Japan 20 20 21 
Canada -1 18   
Italy 28 48 20 
Netherlands   5 10 
Sweden -2 20 -7 
Finland 39 28 20 
Data for Sweden cover all insurance companies 
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UK  15.8 8.7 9.8 9.7 5.9 12.8 
US 13.2 9.2 8.4 10.9 4.5 11.8 
Germany 9.7 7.0 6.7 6.9 6 5.9 
Japan 8.9 9.1 6.9 9.4 4.4 10.2 
Canada 12.4 10.0 7.5 10.6 4.8 10 
Netherlands 9.2 6.3 6.3 6.7 4.6 6 
Sweden 11.5 15.2 4.9 15.9 2 13.1 
Average 11.5 9.4 7.2 10.0 4.6 10.0 
Prudent 
person 





12.7 8.6 8.0 9.5 5.0 10.2 
Restrictions 10.6 11.1 5.8 11.4 4.0 9.5 
Source, Davis and Steil (2000), own calculations. 
 






Real return Standard 
deviation 
UK  14.5 7.4 8.7 8.4 
US 11.4 8.4 6.7 9.8 
Germany 10.8 3.8 7.8 3.7 
Japan 7.5 6.4 5.5 6.7 
Canada 11.9 6.5 6.9 6.6 
Netherlands 9.9 4.9 7.1 5.1 
Sweden 12.8 13.9 6.1 14.4 
Average 11.2 7.3 7.0 7.8 
Prudent 
person 
11.9 6.9 7.5 7.8 
Restrictions 10.7 6.1 6.6 7.9 
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Table 12: Pension fund and life insurance real returns and benchmarks (1980-95) 
 



















Canada Mean 6.9 7.5 6.6 10.6 0.3 
 Standard 
deviation 
6.6 10.6 13.1 14.1 1.2 
Germany Mean 7.8 6.7 10.4 9.3 1.4 
 Standard 
deviation 
3.7 6.9 18.4 18.4 1.4 
Japan Mean 5.5 6.9 9.6 8.9 1.4 
 Standard 
deviation 
6.7 9.4 14.5 9.8 1.3 
Netherlands Mean 7.1 6.3 11.4 9.9 0.1 
 Standard 
deviation 
5.1 6.7 19.5 13.7 1.7 
Sweden Mean 6.1 4.9 10.3 10.4 0.3 
 Standard 
deviation 
14.4 15.9 21.7 15.3 2.4 
United 
Kingdom 
Mean 8.7 9.8 9.2 10.2 3.0 
  Standard 
deviation 
8.4 9.7 11.9 15.2 1.2 
United 
States 
Mean 6.7 8.4 8.7 10.0 -0.8 
 Standard 
deviation 
9.8 10.9 12.6 15.5 1.4 
Source, Davis and Steil (2000), own calculations. 
 
Table 13 Comparing pension fund and life insurance real returns with benchmarks 
 
Real return on  Life insurance less:  Pension funds less:  
 50-50 Global Real 
earnings 
50-50 Global Real 
earnings 
Canada 0.3 -3.7 6.6 0.9 -3.2 7.2 
Germany -2.6 -1.5 6.4 -3.7 -2.6 5.3 
Japan -4.1 -3.4 4.1 -2.7 -2.0 5.5 
Netherlands -4.3 -2.8 7.0 -5.0 -3.5 6.2 
Sweden -4.2 -4.3 5.8 -5.4 -5.6 4.6 
United Kingdom -0.5 -1.5 5.7 0.6 -0.4 6.9 
United States -2.0 -3.3 7.5 -0.3 -1.6 9.2 
Average -2.2 -2.9 6.5 -2.2 -2.7 6.4 
Prudent person -2.2 -2.5 6.7 -1.8 -1.9 6.9 
Prudent person 
excluding Japan 
na na na -1.6 -1.8 7.4 
Restrictions -2.7 -3.3 5.7 -4.6 -4.1 4.9 
Source, Davis and Steil (2000), own calculations. 
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Annex: Necessary capabilities for regulating long term institutions 
 
Developing countries often lack the pre-existing capacity to regulate financial markets and institutions. A general 
point made by Vittas (1993) is that a country which is unable to manage well an unfunded or funded public pension 
system, because of administrative inefficiency, shortage of skilled personnel or political interference would most likely 
be unable to regulate and supervise a private pension system, be it mandatory or voluntary, or a competitive and 
liberalised life sector. Ability to enact clear rules and penalise malfeasance in a predictable way will likely be lacking in 
such cases (James and Vittas 1995). It may be added that pension and insurance regulators typically rely on other 
regulators such as those of securities markets (e.g. to prevent insider trading in equity markets) and financial 
institutions (notably of banks) and regulation of long term institutions can thus not be seen in isolation (Turner and 
Rajnes 1995). Mitchell (1997) notes in addition the need for efficient oversight of contributions via computerisation 
and secure record keeping. A further complement for regulation is use of a sound accounting methodology such as 
the FASB of the US, including a requirement to mark assets to market. 
 
Vittas (1994) sets out some specific aspects of the regulatory structure that are needed in order to introduce an 
effective mandatory funded pension system, which also apply to life insurance and voluntary pension schemes. In 
particular, he notes that it may be necessary to create or reorganise insurance regulatory agencies, which have 
traditionally been concerned with the verification of compliance with arbitrary price and product controls, to rather 
emphasise market discipline, solvency monitoring and consumer protection, and to employ experienced professionals. 
They may need extensive training, perhaps aided by close links with agencies in OECD countries and international 
financial organisations, and also consultation and co-operation with market professionals. Such training should be of 
regulators and professional staff, as well as fund managers, actuaries, accountants and auditors. 
 
Furthermore, developing countries need to strengthen the supervisory and intervention powers of regulators. They 
must be independent of the regulated institutions. To ensure systemic stability, and compliance with solvency, 
investment and consumer protection rules, regulators have to exercise effective supervision via off-site surveillance 
and on site inspections. They need effective intervention powers to enforce corrective measures. They must establish 
objective criteria for entry and exit, setting out authorisation criteria for insurance companies and pension fund 
managers, establishing rules for the exit of insolvent firms and opening the market for new entry from domestic and 
foreign firms. Markets dominance by a small number of government controlled insurance companies is a recipe for low 
returns. Openness to new entry 36 while ensuring stability may require moderate but not excessive capital 
requirements. 
 
                                                                 
36 This openness may help to create a contestable market, wherein a seeming oligopoly situations may be 
characterised by competitive behaviour on the part of existing firms, because of the potential for new firms to enter in 
a "hit and run" manner in response to excess profits. 
